

IMPACT-se

Analyzing UNRWA's Response to the UN Independent Review (Colonna Report)

July 2026

Executive Summary

In April 2024, former French Foreign Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Catherine Colonna, led an independent review of UNRWA on behalf of the United Nations following allegations concerning neutrality, educational content, staff conduct, and the agency's links to terrorist organizations. The resulting report, commonly known as the Colonna Report, assessed UNRWA's policies and practices and issued fifty recommendations intended to strengthen neutrality, accountability, oversight, and institutional integrity. This report examines UNRWA's implementation of those recommendations between April 2024 and May 2026. It draws on UNRWA's quarterly progress reports, funding requests, public statements, policy documents, and educational materials, alongside independent research conducted by IMPACT-se on UNRWA schools, teaching materials, and textbook content.

The significance of the Colonna recommendations should not be understated. They were issued in response to findings that included educational materials constituting a "grave violation of neutrality," alongside weaknesses in oversight, accountability, and institutional safeguards. The recommendations examined in this report addressed issues central to UNRWA's credibility and mandate. Several were introduced in response to findings that educational materials contained content inconsistent with UN values and that existing safeguards had proven insufficient. Given the significance of these recommendations, implementation cannot be measured solely by reported completion rates; it must be assessed by whether they have resulted in demonstrable changes to the policies, practices, and oversight mechanisms the review sought to address.

This paper advances the following key findings:

- UNRWA's response to the Colonna Report has been characterized more by procedural compliance and evolving reporting metrics than by clearly demonstrable institutional reform. There remains limited publicly available evidence of meaningful structural change.
- UNRWA's implementation reporting contains significant inconsistencies and has become increasingly difficult to assess. The introduction of the 'Minimum Viable Product' (MVP) methodology in June 2025 lowered the threshold for recommendations to be classified as complete, contributing to a dramatic increase in reported progress while reducing transparency and comparability over time. Several recommendations previously classified as completed now appear to remain incomplete, even under UNRWA's own benchmark of achieving core functionality.
- UNRWA's funding requests raise serious accountability concerns. The agency has repeatedly requested additional funding for recommendations it had already reported as completed, while many requests lack publicly available budget breakdowns, implementation plans, or clear distinctions between reform costs and ongoing operational expenditure.
- Education-related recommendations show little evidence of substantive implementation. Despite commitments to review educational materials, remove problematic content, and strengthen neutrality, there is limited evidence that these reforms have been meaningfully carried out in practice.
- The continued use of educational materials containing antisemitic narratives, glorification of violence, and encouragement of jihad raises serious questions about the credibility of UNRWA's reform claims. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the Colonna process has thus far generated limited publicly verifiable evidence of deep institutional change within the agency.

Introduction

The atrocities of October 7 served as a wakeup call for many across the MENA region and beyond, who watched in horror as Hamas terrorists carried out acts of unprecedented brutality. In January 2024, it came to light that UNRWA staff were alleged to have participated in these attacks: the employees of a UN agency, mandated to deliver humanitarian aid, had committed acts of terror. In addition to accounts of staff participation in the atrocities, some of UNRWA's school facilities were utilized to store weaponry and, in some cases, as entrances to Hamas tunnels where weaponry is stored and command centers are located. These revelations call into question the existence and future of an international organization alleged to be aiding an internationally recognized terror organization. The Colonna Report was presented as a framework through which the agency would undertake meaningful institutional reform and restore donor confidence. However, more than two years after the report's publication, significant questions remain regarding the extent to which these reforms have been substantively implemented in practice.

This paper argues that UNRWA's response to the Colonna Report has been characterized more by procedural compliance and evolving reporting methodologies than by clearly demonstrable reform. While the agency has presented significant implementation progress and resumed engagement with donor states, inconsistencies in reporting, shifting benchmarks for completion, opaque funding requests, and continuing evidence of problematic educational content raise serious questions regarding the transparency, credibility, and substance of the reforms being claimed.

The analysis focuses on three central areas. First, it examines inconsistencies in UNRWA's reporting and implementation methodology, including the introduction of revised benchmarks that altered how recommendations were classified as completed. Second, it analyzes concerns relating to funding requests, oversight mechanisms, and long-term accountability, particularly where recommendations described as completed continued to generate substantial financial demands. Third, it evaluates UNRWA's implementation of education-related recommendations, including the continued circulation of problematic educational content despite explicit commitments to neutrality reform. Together, these issues suggest that the Colonna process has, thus far, produced limited publicly verifiable evidence of substantive institutional change within UNRWA. Alongside its broader implications, this means that children in UNRWA schools continue to be exposed to educational materials containing problematic themes, including antisemitic narratives, glorification of violence, and incitement.

Background of the Colonna Report:

In February 2024, in response to public outcry, the UN Secretary-General and UNRWA's Commissioner-General established an "Independent Review Group." Led by former French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, the group was tasked with identifying breaches of neutrality within UNRWA and recommending reforms to address them. Donor nations, many of whom had frozen financial support of the agency, awaited the findings of what came to be known as the Colonna Report.

Throughout this process, IMPACT-se, a research and policy institute specializing in textbook analysis, has been active in its engagement with the UN concerning the Colonna Report. It was one of the only NGOs invited to testify before the UN panel investigating UNRWA and was approached a second time to present evidence to Chair Catherine Colonna. Following the testimony, Ms. Colonna requested further information; IMPACT-se then provided a 245-page dossier on hate-teaching and antisemitism in UNRWA schools and educational materials.

The long-awaited report was published in April 2024, outlining fifty recommendations across ten areas of concern, which is demonstrative of the scale and depth of neutrality failures in UNRWA's operation. In response, in May 2024, UNRWA published an internal action plan, which remains unavailable to the public. In its place, the agency has relied upon public statements, website updates, and social media posts to communicate its reform efforts, creating the impression of rapid progress. However, while at first glance the volume of communication implies momentum, a closer examination reveals a different picture.

UNRWA's response to the Colonna Report has been marked by inconsistencies in reporting and factual discrepancies. More than two years after the report's publication, there remains limited publicly available evidence of substantial structural, procedural, or institutional reform. Nevertheless, several international donor states, like Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, EU, Switzerland, Germany, UK, and Spain have resumed funding on the basis of UNRWA's reported progress toward implementing the Colonna recommendations.

Rather than serving as a catalyst for substantive reform, the Colonna Report increasingly appears to have been incorporated into a largely procedural compliance process. The focus on reporting progress risks creating the appearance of accountability without necessarily resolving the deeper structural issues identified within UNRWA. In this way, the agency is able to maintain international legitimacy and donor confidence while many underlying concerns remain insufficiently addressed. Firstly, the lack of public evidence available for UNRWA's changes indicates a lack of transparency and inhibits independent oversight. Secondly, donor nations have justified the resumption of financial support without having to engage in the uncomfortable yet necessary scrutiny of UNRWA's changes or lack thereof. The agency increasingly appears to derive legitimacy from reported reform progress in quarterly reviews and procedural compliance, despite limited publicly available evidence of substantial change on the ground.

This paper highlights the gaps between UNRWA's stated reform commitments and its conduct following the publication of the Colonna Report. Commissioned within the UN system, the report itself was not entirely independent. However, it establishes a baseline framework largely grounded in UNRWA's own institutional context and commitments. Even against this relatively limited standard, our research finds little credible evidence of meaningful reform or sustained engagement with the report's recommendations, raising broader questions about the reliability of the agency's claims regarding implementation and progress. The arguments outlined below reflect extensive research and close monitoring of UNRWA's actions and reporting since the inception of the Colonna process.

1. Inconsistent Reporting of Recommendation Completion

To contextualize UNRWA's response to the Colonna Report, it is first necessary to examine the agency's own reporting on its implementation of the recommendations. Following the release of the Colonna Report, UNRWA published a High-Level Action Plan in August 2024. By September 2024, the agency reported that two recommendations had been fully implemented, while seventeen were still in progress.

However, later updates appear inconsistent. In January 2025 UNRWA said that twelve recommendations were completed or in progress yet in March 2025 they said that only nine recommendations were completed or in progress. The discrepancy between these updates raises questions about the transparency and consistency of the reporting process. Such a substantial revision is difficult to explain as a routine correction and raises questions about the reliability of the agency's reporting framework and implementation metrics. This is particularly notable given the above statistic, as both figures are lower than the number reported in September 2024, which was nineteen. UNRWA also stated that six additional recommendations were expected to be completed by the end of the first quarter of 2025. The volume of changing figures reported across successive updates, combined with the absence of any detailed explanation for these revisions, creates uncertainty regarding how implementation progress is being communicated.



Similar inconsistencies appeared in later updates. In April 2025, UNRWA reported that only five recommendations had been completed, suggesting a slow and limited pace of implementation. Yet just months later, in September 2025, the agency claimed that 21 of the 50 recommendations had been completed by the end of the third quarter, before increasing this figure again in December to 29 completed recommendations. The sharp contrast between these figures raises questions about the consistency and reliability of UNRWA's reporting. The rapid change in reported figures raises questions regarding the consistency of the benchmarks and methodology used to assess implementation progress. These shifting timelines and fluctuating benchmarks could suggest either significant inconsistencies in the agency's reporting methodology or a lack of transparency regarding how progress was being measured.



These discrepancies raise broader questions about the purpose and presentation of UNRWA's reporting. Rather than reflecting a clear and consistent implementation process, the agency's June 2025 update appeared to emphasize accelerated progress after months of stagnation. The abrupt shift to reporting substantially higher figures within a short period creates the impression that benchmarks were being redefined or selectively communicated in order to strengthen perceptions of compliance while limiting meaningful external scrutiny.

The inconsistencies and abrupt shifts in UNRWA's reporting suggest that the agency's implementation metrics were neither stable nor consistently applied, raising important questions about the standards and methodology underlying its claims of progress.

2. Newly Created Benchmarks for Completion:

The driving force of the progress outlined in the previous section appears to have been caused by the introduction of a new UNRWA methodology in June 2025, referred to as the MVP. Under this new benchmark, a recommendation could be classified as "fully implemented" once its "core functional objective" had been met. This represented a significant shift in the meaning of implementation, as recommendations could now be considered complete even when important elements remained outstanding. By separating a recommendation's "core" objective from its other requirements, the methodology allowed partial implementation to be presented as full completion. UNRWA's reporting further complicates this issue by referring to ten recommendations requiring "long-term action," without identifying which recommendations fall into this category or explaining why they are treated differently. This lack of transparency is further illustrated in UNRWA's May 2026 report, which stated that Recommendation 46, relating to the outsourcing of pay-setting functions to an independent entity, had been "closed" as unimplementable. Although UNRWA stated that it had explored possible avenues for implementation, there is no indication that this conclusion was independently reviewed or discussed with those responsible for overseeing the Colonna process. A recommendation originally accepted as a reform commitment was therefore effectively abandoned and reclassified as "closed" by UNRWA itself. There appears to be a disconnect between these findings and the stated objective that all fifty recommendations would lead to sustained institutional reform. By lowering the threshold for completion, the MVP framework enabled UNRWA to present partial or preliminary measures as constituting technical compliance with the recommendations.

The methodology is particularly problematic because the definition of what constitutes a recommendation's "core functional objective" appears to have been left largely to UNRWA's own interpretation. This creates substantial room for subjectivity and selective reporting. It allows the agency to determine for itself which aspects of a recommendation are essential, and which can remain incomplete while still claiming success. In practice, this risks transforming implementation metrics from objective indicators into flexible benchmarks that can be adjusted to produce more favourable outcomes. In addition, if achieving only a "core functional objective" is sufficient for a recommendation to be considered fully implemented, then recommendations still classified as "in progress" must, by definition, remain at a very early stage. The distinction between partial and full implementation is, therefore, significantly blurred. Since the recommendations marked as "completed" are unlikely to undergo further review, UNRWA's own interpretation of what constitutes the "core" of a recommendation may effectively replace the broader intent of the Colonna Report itself.

Concerns are further heightened by the apparent lack of external oversight surrounding the introduction of the MVP methodology. There is no indication that this revised standard was formally discussed with, approved by, or independently validated by any authority responsible for monitoring implementation of the Colonna recommendations. As a result, UNRWA appears to have unilaterally redefined the criteria for success midway through the implementation process.

The apparent retroactive application of the MVP framework is equally significant. Recommendations that had previously been considered incomplete appeared as completed under the new methodology, helping to explain the sharp increase in reported implementation activity beginning in June 2025. In April 2025, UNRWA reported that only five recommendations had been completed. Just two months later, following the introduction of the MVP framework, the agency reported that twenty recommendations had been completed. Given that only five recommendations had been reported as completed over the preceding year, the sudden increase within two months appears more consistent with a change in methodology than with a sudden acceleration of reform efforts.

The introduction of the MVP methodology was also accompanied by a notable change in UNRWA's reporting practices. Prior to June 2025, the agency's updates generally identified individual recommendations and provided information on their implementation status. Following the adoption of the MVP framework, reporting increasingly shifted toward broad thematic categories rather than specific recommendations. This further reduces transparency and makes it considerably more difficult to track the progress of individual recommendations over time. As a result, external observers can no longer easily determine whether particular recommendations have advanced, stalled, or been reclassified, limiting the ability to independently assess the consistency and accuracy of UNRWA's implementation claims.

In addition, one of the stated justifications for introducing the MVP methodology was that it "accelerates delivery" of the recommendations. On its surface, this may appear to be a neutral or even positive objective. However, the underlying implication is more problematic. Redefining the threshold for what counts as "complete" does not inherently improve the substance or quality of the reforms being carried out. Instead, the concept of accelerating delivery in this context appears primarily concerned with accelerating the ability to classify recommendations as completed. In effect, the methodology risks prioritizing the appearance of rapid progress over the achievement of comprehensive and durable institutional reform. Rather than strengthening implementation, the MVP framework may, therefore, function chiefly as a reporting mechanism that enables UNRWA to present recommendations as fulfilled more quickly without necessarily improving the underlying outcomes.

The agency's Q1 2026 update appears to reinforce these concerns. UNRWA stated that it had "closed" an additional eleven recommendations, bringing the total to forty out of fifty recommendations completed and representing "eighty percent overall progress" toward implementation of the Colonna commitments. The agency further claimed "100 per cent implementation of planned activities envisaged for 2024 and 2025." However, these figures rely on the same MVP methodology previously discussed, under which recommendations may be classified as completed once only their "core functional objective" has been met. As a result, the reported figures do not necessarily reflect full implementation of the recommendations themselves, but rather UNRWA's internally defined threshold for closure.



Image: Within one year, 35 recommendations have been marked as "closed", marking a departure from the terminology of completion.

This is particularly significant given that several recommendations previously classified as completed now appear incomplete even under UNRWA's own benchmark of core functionality, including recommendations relating to textbook review mechanisms and reporting channels for problematic educational content. The introduction of the term "closed" in place of "completed" further complicates the interpretation of UNRWA's reporting and may reflect an increasing emphasis on administrative closure rather than demonstrable institutional reform.

In essence, this new methodology enables UNRWA to present accelerated implementation progress without necessarily delivering substantive or systemic reform. By redefining what constitutes successful implementation according to its own internally determined metrics, while simultaneously obscuring which reforms have actually been completed, UNRWA appears to reduce the effectiveness of external scrutiny that the Colonna Report was intended to establish.

3. Follow the Money: Contradictions in Funding Requests

One of the more serious issues arising from UNRWA's handling of the Colonna Report concerns discrepancies in its funding requests. In several instances, the agency has sought additional funding for recommendations that it had already publicly described as "fully implemented," as will be demonstrated below. Measures previously presented as completed subsequently reappeared in later funding appeals, while recommendations that UNRWA claimed had already been implemented using existing donor support were assigned new budgetary requirements.

These inconsistencies raise concerns about potential duplication in financing and cast doubt on the reliability of the agency's reporting regarding both implementation and resource allocation. More broadly, they suggest that the Colonna Report may be functioning not solely as a framework for institutional reform, but also as a continuing justification for expanded donor funding. If recommendations can simultaneously be presented as "fully implemented" while still requiring substantial additional financing, the distinction between genuine reform implementation and the use of reform frameworks to justify additional funding requests becomes increasingly difficult to assess.

In addition, UNRWA's implementation model appears to blur the distinction between discrete reform measures and the agency's ongoing operational structure. Initiatives are often introduced without clearly defined completion criteria or measurable end states, making it difficult to determine when a recommendation has actually been fulfilled and when related funding should reasonably conclude. Simultaneously, recurring institutional functions, such as staffing, vetting systems, compliance procedures, and oversight mechanisms, are frequently embedded within reform budgets in ways that obscure whether donor funding is supporting temporary implementation costs or subsidizing permanent operational expansion. Comparable international organizations typically provide detailed budget breakdowns and justifications for funding requests, making the absence of such information here notable. For example, UNICEF's 2026–2029 Integrated Budget clearly distinguishes between program expenditure, development activities, and institutional costs, while explaining how resources are allocated and the assumptions underlying projected spending. Such distinctions enable donors to assess the purpose and duration of funding requests, a level of transparency that is often lacking in UNRWA's reform-related budgeting.

This creates a structural accountability problem. When reforms are framed as open-ended processes rather than finite deliverables, recommendations can become continual funding vehicles rather than measurable institutional changes. The lack of transparency surrounding staffing allocations and operational expenditures further deepens this concern, particularly where responsibilities appear duplicative or insufficiently explained. It also raises the concern that UNRWA may be seeking additional funding from the international community for recommendations it has already publicly classified as completed. Whether this reflects incomplete implementation, shifting benchmarks, or duplicated financing requests, the result is the same: a significant lack of transparency surrounding both the agency's reform process and its use of donor funds.

Below are some examples of UNRWA's funding requests that have raised concerns regarding proportionality and transparency:

Claims of Completion and Further Funding Requests

Recommendation 4

UNRWA claimed in January 2025 that Recommendation Four had been fully implemented, citing the recruitment of ten new staff members to strengthen its Internal Oversight Services Department and Ethics Office in order to ensure neutrality. However, subsequent funding requests sought additional resources for nine further staff positions intended to enhance the same oversight capacity, including recurring multi-year costs of $520,000 alongside a further one-time payment of $10,000.

This raises clear inconsistencies in both the agency's implementation reporting and financial justifications. If the recommendation had already been fully implemented, it is unclear why substantial additional staffing was required only months later. UNRWA provides no explanation as to why the initial hires were insufficient, what new functions the additional staff would perform, or why these costs were not accounted for in the original implementation process. The absence of any clear justification creates the impression that the recommendation was declared complete before the underlying institutional requirements had actually been resolved, as exhibited in the following images.

4	Strengthened internal oversight capacity by ensuring the unit in HQ and travel to fields to do training. Staff requirement: 2 P4 and 1 P3 in HQ, 6 Area Staff in fields.	USD 520,000 multi-year and USD 10,000 one-off.

Recommendation 5

The fifth recommendation calls for the expansion of UNRWA's Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS) and Ethics Office, which the agency claimed had been "fully implemented" by December 2024. However, this same recommendation reappeared in UNRWA's January 2025 funding requests, highlighting a clear inconsistency between claimed completion and continued financial demands.

UNRWA's request for an additional $100,000 under this already "completed" recommendation raises further concerns. No justification has been provided for this substantial sum, nor clarity on what additional work remains outstanding. Even if "completion" refers only to a minimal or initial phase, the scale of the funding request appears disproportionate and lacks transparency, as demonstrated in the following images.

As of the end of 2024, a total of 5 recommendations[1] had been fully implemented:

- **Recommendation 5:** Expand the reach and presence of DIOS and the Ethics Office in UNRWA fields of operations.
- **Recommendation 8**: Pending an evaluation, create a centralized Neutrality Investigations Unit with international staff, that reports directly to the DIOS to oversee field office-led investigation.
- **Recommendation 23:** Reinforce the existing regular sharing of digital staff lists with host countries and Israel.
- **Recommendation 29:** Train staff on the civilian nature of UNRWA's facilities.
- **Recommendation 49:** UNRWA to enhance its participation in the humanitarian coordination system.

5	Expanding reach and presence in fields of DIOS and Ethics departments to improve neutrality activities in fields.	USD 100,000 one-off.

Recommendation 29

Recommendation 29 follows a similar pattern. UNRWA stated that this recommendation, relating to neutrality training, had been fully implemented in September 2024. However, it was subsequently included again in the January 2025 funding requests, this time with an additional request for $275,000.

This substantial one-off request, submitted just four months after the recommendation was declared complete, raises clear concerns. No explanation has been provided regarding the purpose of these funds, what additional work remains, or what justifies the scale of the amount requested. This lack of clarity further highlights ongoing issues around consistency, transparency, and accountability in UNRWA's reporting and financial practices.

At this point, two recommendations have been fully implemented (#23 regarding sharing staff lists with host nations and Israel and #29 regarding training on neutrality of installations). Seventeen recommendations are in progress, and internal preparations are underway for many that have a longer timeframe (medium and long-term), and for which additional funding may be required.

29	In person training of staff in fields on the civilian nature of UNRWA's facilities to strengthen neutrality.	USD 275,000 one-off.

Recommendation 41

Recommendation 41 raises further concerns regarding the scale and transparency of UNRWA's education-related funding requests. Unlike many other budget lines, these requests often lack clarity as to whether they represent one-off expenditures or recurring multiyear costs. Particularly notable is UNRWA's request for an "estimated $23,000,000 in total" for "Training in Critical Thinking Approach, including humanitarian principles and human rights at school levels," despite also acknowledging that funding for pilot training in Jordan had already been secured.

The size of this request appears especially difficult to justify given that UNRWA has previously stated that the Critical Thinking Approach was already incorporated within its educational framework prior to the Colonna Report. If the methodology, training structures, and pilot funding were already in place, it remains unclear why such a substantial additional allocation is necessary. Moreover, if the Critical Thinking Approach was already being implemented across UNRWA's educational system, the fact that the Colonna Report nonetheless identified significant concerns and recommended reforms to educational content and neutrality raises questions about the effectiveness of the existing approach. This suggests that either the program was not being implemented as comprehensively as claimed or that it was insufficient to address the issues identified by the review. The absence of any detailed budgetary breakdown or implementation plan further raises concerns regarding the proportionality, transparency, and necessity of the request. Links to the following images can be found here.

34/35/36	Review and adjust content of all textbooks and supplements with host countries, Israel and the Palestinian Authority to improve neutrality in education.	Estimated USD 38,000,000 in total and USD 120,000.
38	Establish a dedicated channel for UNRWA to receive alerts on problematic teaching content and to support teachers seeking advice in order to ensure transparency and neutrality. Staff requirement: 2 staff in HQ.	Estimated USD 800,000 multi-year.
40	Digitization of educational content to increase transparency. This will be done by establishing a Digital Learning Competency and Transformation Unit, extending capacity-building in fields and launching the digitized materials.	Estimated USD 180,000,000 in total.
41	Training in Critical Thinking Approach, including humanitarian principles and human rights at school levels. Resources for pilot training in Jordan is secured.	Estimated USD 23,000,000 in total.

Separately, in total, UNRWA has requested $1,010,000 to implement recommendations it has already claimed are complete, including $520,000 in recurring annual funding for measures described as already implemented. These examples point to a consistent pattern in which UNRWA seeks additional funding for recommendations it has already declared complete, often requesting substantial sums, amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars, without clear justification. This goes beyond a minor inconsistency and raises fundamental questions about the reliability of UNRWA's reporting and the rationale behind these funding requests. Unlike standard practice among comparable international organizations, these requests are not accompanied by detailed budget breakdowns, defined deliverables, or implementation plans. Many are presented as one-off payments, with no indication of sustained programming or how the funds would be used over time.

Questions of Oversight Independence and Long-Term Implementation

Recommendation 24

Another concern arises from recommendations for which UNRWA has requested only minimal or one-time funding despite the measures clearly requiring continuous, long-term implementation. This creates the impression that certain reform costs may be deliberately framed as temporary in order to make funding requests appear more limited and manageable than they are in practice.

Recommendation 24 illustrates this issue clearly. Although the recommendation involves establishing a continuous staff vetting process, an inherently ongoing institutional function requiring sustained monitoring, staffing, and review, UNRWA requested only a one-time payment of $200,000 for its implementation. This raises questions about how such a permanent and recurring process could realistically be supported through a single, finite allocation.

The discrepancy suggests either that the long-term costs of implementation are being understated, or that future funding requests for the same activity may later emerge despite the recommendation already having been presented as funded and implemented.

24. Establish a *continuous vetting process*, especially in the event of staff promotion.

22/24	Identify and implement additional ways to screen UNRWA staff at an early stage of the recruitment process.	USD 200,000 one-off.

Recommendation 31

In seeking to increase the frequency and scope of oversight visits to UNRWA facilities, including sites where military activity is suspected, the agency requested funding for only a three-year period without providing any indication of how such oversight mechanisms would be sustained thereafter. Given that the risks and concerns the recommendation is intended to address are not temporary in nature, the absence of any long-term plan raises questions about whether the initiative is designed as a durable accountability mechanism or merely as a short-term compliance measure.

The proposal also leaves unresolved questions regarding the independence and credibility of the oversight process itself. It remains unclear who exactly would receive this funding and carry out these oversight activities. If the personnel responsible for conducting inspections and monitoring are employed or funded directly by UNRWA, this risks undermining the very independence the recommendation appears intended to establish. Effective oversight, particularly in relation to allegations of military activity at UNRWA facilities, would arguably require genuinely neutral and externally accountable personnel rather than individuals operating within the agency's own institutional structure.

31. Ensure additional capacities to *increase the frequency and widen the scope of installation visits* to also include military misuse of UNRWA facilities.

31	Increase frequency and widen scope of visits to facilities by humanitarian principles officers to ensure neutrality of UNRWA's facilities. Staff requirement: staff in fields.	USD 1,050,000 multi-year (three years).

These requests appear to obscure the true long-term costs of implementation. Recommendations involving inherently continuous activities, such as staff vetting and oversight inspections, are at times presented as requiring only one-off or short-term funding, despite clearly necessitating sustained institutional support. At the same time, UNRWA provides little clarity regarding who will carry out oversight functions and whether those mechanisms are genuinely independent of the agency itself. Without credible external oversight, funding intended to strengthen accountability risks remaining embedded within UNRWA's own institutional structure.

In this context, and given well-documented concerns regarding the misuse of UNRWA facilities and infrastructure by Hamas, the absence of transparency around these funding requests is particularly concerning. Without clear safeguards, oversight, and accountability, formal reservations remain regarding whether donor funds are being allocated in a transparent manner.

4. Selective Implementation of Recommendations Regarding Education

An important set of requirements in the Colonna Report concerns the review and reform of educational materials used in UNRWA schools, with the PA textbooks used by UNRWA containing "issues of concern to UN values" which were described in the report as being a "grave violation of neutrality." The thematic focus on education within the Colonna Report reflects longstanding concerns regarding the content taught in UNRWA schools and the agency's oversight of educational materials. Prior to the review, a series of reports by IMPACT-se, alongside broader scrutiny of UNRWA's educational practices, documented concerns relating to both the use of PA textbooks and supplementary materials produced within the agency's educational framework. Consequently, the Colonna Report devoted multiple recommendations to textbook review, neutrality safeguards, and educational accountability, making education one of the clearest areas requiring improvement. As one of UNRWA's core functions in the West Bank and Gaza, education lies at the heart of the agency's mandate and legitimacy. The quality, content, and neutrality of the education provided in UNRWA schools are therefore central to assessing the agency's effectiveness and its fulfilment of its responsibilities to Palestinian children.

Recommendation 34 calls on UNRWA to "review the content of all textbooks and supplements with host countries, Israel and the Palestinian Authority," emphasizing the need for international and cross-party engagement regarding textbook content. Recommendation 35 addresses the substance of these concerns more directly, requiring UNRWA to "ban any hate speech, incitement to violence and/or antisemitic references from host-country textbooks and locally produced supplements in UNRWA schools. In the meantime, stop using such material."

However, there is no evidence that Recommendation 34 has been meaningfully implemented, while UNRWA has made no clear claim that it has complied with Recommendation 35. This is particularly significant because Recommendation 35 explicitly requires the immediate banning of materials that contain hate speech, incitement to violence, and antisemitic content from educational materials. The absence of evidence that such content has been removed suggests that one of the report's most urgent recommendations has yet to be fulfilled. UNRWA's reporting merely states that Israeli authorities may raise concerns with the agency, implying that responsibility for initiating engagement has been shifted to Israel rather than undertaken by UNRWA itself. The Colonna Report specifically required the content of textbooks to be shared with host countries, whereas in UNRWA's December 2025 update, it was claimed that this would only be done upon "official request," which is evidence for a lack of fulfilment of the recommendation. At the same time, research conducted by IMPACT-se continues to identify problematic material in educational content used within UNRWA schools, including examples of incitement and antisemitic narratives. This suggests that, despite the explicit requirements of the Colonna Report, UNRWA has neither established a transparent review mechanism with relevant stakeholders nor demonstrated that educational materials containing such content have been banned from use.

Meanwhile, Recommendation 38 details the establishment of a dedicated channel or hotline for UNRWA to receive alerts on problematic textbook content, and to support teachers seeking advice surrounding such content. However, there is no evidence of Recommendation 38 coming to fruition.

January 2025 Quarterly Report

UNRWA's January 2025 quarterly update claimed that implementation had been initiated for several education-related recommendations, including the establishment of "a dedicated channel to report problematic teaching content" under Recommendation 38. However, the corresponding funding requests raise significant questions regarding the scale, structure, and necessity of the proposed measures, since UNRWA requested an estimated $800,000 in multi-year funding to establish a reporting channel. By October 2025, Recommendation 38 was marked as complete, yet there is no evidence of such a hotline for reporting problematic content.

June 2025 Quarterly Report:

By June 2025, UNRWA's quarterly update presented these education-related recommendations as significantly advanced, claiming that the agency was strengthening neutrality within its education system through textbook reviews, expanded teacher training, digital learning initiatives, classroom inspections, and new reporting mechanisms for problematic content. This shift coincided with UNRWA's adoption of the MVP methodology, under which recommendations can be classified as complete once a core functional objective has been achieved. As a result, the advancement of several education recommendations provides limited insight into the extent of their actual implementation.

UNRWA further stated that textbook reviews had progressed in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, that materials containing hate speech, antisemitism, or incitement to violence had been banned, and that teacher training in neutrality, human rights, and humanitarian principles was being scaled up across its fields of operation. The agency reported that four of the eight education-related recommendations had been completed, while four remained in progress.

The effectiveness of UNRWA's review mechanisms is further undermined by the pace at which educational materials evolve. Even where UNRWA conducts textbook reviews, lengthy review cycles risk rendering assessments outdated by the time they are completed. This is particularly relevant given recent curriculum changes across the region, including the introduction of dozens of new textbooks in Jordan and the emergence of new national curriculum in Syria following the change in government. UNRWA has claimed to conduct curricular reviews, yet such reviews must be ongoing to remain effective. Since June 2025, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, and Syria have all introduced new textbooks or curriculum materials, with no public evidence that these have subsequently been reviewed, making it difficult to regard Recommendation 34 as fully implemented. As long as UNRWA continues to rely on host-country curricula without independently reviewing new content as it is introduced, there is a risk that problematic material may continue to enter classrooms faster than review processes can identify and address it.

UNRWA's claims of recommendation completions further raise substantial questions when viewed alongside both the earlier January 2025 update and the corresponding funding requests. Measures to address recommendations were described in January as merely "initiated," yet only months later presented as large-scale operational reforms nearing completion, despite the absence of publicly available evidence demonstrating meaningful implementation or measurable outcomes. At the same time, the vast funding requests attached to these recommendations appear difficult to reconcile with the relatively limited activities described in the updates.

Moreover, several of the measures highlighted by UNRWA remain framed in broad and highly generalized terms, such as "strengthening neutrality," "scaling up training," or "advancing textbook reviews," without providing concrete metrics, independent verification, or detailed evidence of substantive changes to educational content. This lack of specificity is particularly significant given continuing findings by IMPACT-se identifying problematic material within textbooks used in UNRWA schools. As a result, the updates risk creating the appearance of substantial reform progress without providing sufficient transparency to meaningfully assess the depth, effectiveness, or durability of the measures being claimed.

December 2025 Quarterly Report:

By December 2025, UNRWA claimed that Recommendation 34, concerning the review of all textbooks and supplementary materials used in its schools, had been finalized. According to the agency, it had completed all actions "within its control," including systematic textbook reviews and the establishment of mechanisms to share findings with relevant authorities upon official request. However, the recommendation called on UNRWA to review educational materials with host countries, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. The recommendation envisaged a collaborative review process involving these stakeholders, rather than a system in which findings are shared only if requested. Yet UNRWA's reporting points only to the possibility of Israeli authorities raising concerns with the agency, rather than the collaborative review process envisaged by the recommendation. As a result, it is difficult to conclude that the recommendation has been implemented as originally intended. UNRWA also pointed to teacher training initiatives, and guidance on the Critical Thinking Approach and neutrality-focused pedagogy as evidence of progress. At the same time, however, the agency acknowledged that the further development of UNRWA-owned educational materials aligned with UN values and UNESCO standards would require "significant additional resources" and had, therefore, been deferred as a longer-term institutional objective.

These claims reveal significant tensions within UNRWA's reporting. On the one hand, Recommendation 34 is presented as fully implemented; on the other, the agency simultaneously concedes that substantial further work remains necessary to develop educational materials genuinely aligned with UN values and international standards. The qualification that UNRWA completed only those actions "within its control" further narrows the scope of what is being claimed as implementation, despite the broader intent of the Colonna recommendations to produce substantive reform in educational content and oversight.

Moreover, the measures cited as evidence of implementation remain largely process-oriented rather than outcome-oriented. There is no publicly available evidence demonstrating that problematic content that should be banned is no longer being taught in educational materials or that the review mechanisms envisioned under Recommendation

34 have resulted in meaningful external oversight or cooperation with Israel and other stakeholders. As a result, the recommendation appears to have been classified as “completed” despite the agency itself acknowledging that key elements of long-term reform remain unresolved and dependent on future funding and institutional development.

May 2026 Quarterly Report:

The Q1 2026 update further underscores these concerns. Despite UNRWA’s broader claims of 80 per cent overall implementation progress, the agency reported no meaningful new progress regarding the banning of problematic educational content. At the same time, UNRWA continued to present recommendations relating to educational neutrality as either completed or institutionally integrated, despite the continued circulation of material containing antisemitic narratives, glorification of violence, and incitement identified in ongoing IMPACT-se research.

UNRWA also stated that recommendations undergo validation through an internal Neutrality Task Force and review by the AdCom Working Group on Neutrality and Integrity. However, neither the evidence submitted for these reviews nor the basis on which recommendations are validated has been made publicly available. Moreover, these mechanisms do not appear to constitute genuinely independent external oversight of neutrality implementation, particularly given the absence of publicly documented engagement with external stakeholders regarding textbook review and educational reform.

The next section will delve into IMPACT-se findings from textbooks used by UNRWA, originally produced by the PA, which showcase the prevalence of problematic content despite UNRWA claims to the contrary.

Educational Content Taught in UNRWA Schools:

When focusing on UNRWA's education of Palestinian children, Recommendation 35 is particularly significant because it explicitly requires UNRWA to immediately cease the use of educational materials containing "hate speech, incitement to violence and/or antisemitic references," even before replacement materials are developed. The recommendation does not condition removal on the prior creation of alternative content; rather, it establishes an immediate obligation to stop using problematic material. Yet there is little evidence that this requirement has been meaningfully implemented. Instead, UNRWA has argued that it is obligated to use and "has no mandate to alter any host government curriculum or textbooks which are a matter of national sovereignty." This suggests that the agency views the modification of textbook content as outside its operational authority. However, this claim is not clearly supported by UNRWA's formal mandate, as there appears to be no explicit prohibition preventing the agency from supplementing, adapting, or moderating problematic educational content where necessary.

In addition, UNRWA's past practice complicates the consistency of the "no mandate" argument. n May 2017, the agency reportedly sought to introduce amendments intended to moderate aspects of the PA curriculum, indicating that some level of intervention in host-country educational material has previously been considered possible. This raises questions about why similar measures are now presented as outside the agency's authority in the context of implementing Recommendation 35.

This creates tension between Recommendation 35 and UNRWA's interpretation of its mandate. If the agency maintains that it cannot remove or replace problematic material originating from host-country curricula, then the recommendation appears difficult to reconcile with full implementation of recommendation 35. This is especially concerning given continuing evidence from IMPACT-se research indicating that problematic PA educational materials remained in circulation in late 2025 and continued to be used within UNRWA schools in both the West Bank and Gaza.

UNRWA has frequently defended its use of PA textbooks by arguing that reliance on host-country curricula represents international best practice in refugee education. However, best practice is a policy-based approach rather than a legal requirement. While many refugee education systems use host-country curricula to facilitate integration and educational continuity, there appears to be no provision within UNRWA's mandate requiring the agency to use textbooks without modification where concerns arise. This suggests that the continued use of educational materials containing content inconsistent with UN values may reflect a policy choice rather than a constraint imposed by UNRWA's mandate.

UNRWA's Digital Learning Platform (DLP) is primarily intended for remote learning during emergencies and is not the main source of classroom instruction. Students continue to use hard-copy PA textbooks, which UNRWA acknowledges it does not amend. Moreover, the platform does not cover key subjects such as social studies, Islamic education, and national education, which have historically contained some of the most problematic content identified in reviews of educational materials. As a result, the expansion of the DLP does not in itself demonstrate that concerns relating to textbook content have been substantively addressed.

This distinction is particularly important given multiple studies conducted by IMPACT-se in 2021 (here and here), 2022, and 2023 which found that UNRWA teachers, principals, schools, and education departments were involved in producing and distributing supplementary teaching materials containing antisemitic content, glorification of terrorism, and encouragement of jihad and martyrdom, including after the launch of the DLP in April 2021.

A dossier submitted by IMPACT-se analyzed thousands of pages of UNRWA's educational materials produced prior to 2023, and documented institutionally produced content containing antisemitic and violent themes. The materials were created and distributed by UNRWA education departments and included the agency's logo, school names, and the names of administrative staff involved in drafting, supervising, approving, and disseminating the content. Examples presented to an UNRWA review panel included material celebrating attacks against Israeli civilians, glorification of terrorist figures such as Dalal Mughrabi, and maps erasing the existence of Israel. IMPACT-se also shared a November 2023 report documenting links between UNRWA's educational environment and the October 7 Hamas attacks, including evidence relating to UNRWA graduates affiliated with Hamas, celebratory school activities, and social me-

dia posts by UNRWA staff praising the attacks. Evidence submitted by IMPACT-se contributed to the UN's conclusion that certain UNRWA teaching materials contained "issues of concern to UN values" and constituted "a grave violation of neutrality."

However, despite these findings and the evidence presented to the UN in the lead-up to the Colonna Report, there has been little indication of substantive change within UNRWA's educational framework since 2023. The measures introduced appear largely procedural or cosmetic in nature, most notably the increased emphasis on the Digital Learning Platform, while problematic content and broader structural concerns continue to persist within the agency's educational environment. This is exemplified in UNRWA's use of PA textbooks, demonstrated in IMPACT-se's November 2025 report, which are frequently used by UNRWA in both the West Bank and Gaza. Textbooks include content promoting jihad, antisemitic tropes, and the use of Qur'anic references to justify violence. These examples, presented below, demonstrate that students between Grades 5 and 9 are still being exposed to material directly inconsistent with the standards outlined in the Colonna Report.

As a result, UNRWA's claims of progress in reviewing educational content and strengthening neutrality appear difficult to reconcile with the continued circulation of such materials. UNRWA explicitly claims that it has no tolerance for hate speech, incitement, discrimination, or violence in educational materials, yet the evidence presented in this section suggests otherwise. The Colonna Report itself concluded that educational content used in UNRWA schools constituted a "grave violation of neutrality" and recommended the removal of antisemitic and violent material from both host-country textbooks and locally produced supplements. Subsequent research has continued to identify problematic content in educational materials used within UNRWA schools, despite the agency's assurances that textbooks are reviewed, teachers are trained to address controversial content, and educational materials are aligned with UN values and UNESCO standards. The persistence of such material raises questions about whether these safeguards are functioning as claimed and whether UNRWA's public statements accurately reflect conditions within its educational environment.

As a result, UNRWA's claims of progress in reviewing educational content and strengthening neutrality appear difficult to reconcile with the continued circulation of such materials. The persistence of these examples strongly suggests that the agency's reforms have focused more on procedural measures and parallel supplementary materials than on the actual removal of problematic content from the educational environment itself.

Jihad and Violence

Example 1.

***Arabic Language,* Grade 5, Vol. 1, 2020–2025, pp. 14–15, 20, 28 (Previously: *Arabic Language*, Grade 5, Vol. 1, 2019, pp. 14–15, 20, 28)**

An Arabic-language reading comprehension text for Grade 5 students, titled "Hooray for the Heroes," glorifies individuals associated with war, violence, religious extremism, and even terrorism. Children are encouraged to see these heroes as their role models–"each of us wishes to be like them"–and those who seek to lead fruitful, peaceful lives instead of taking the path of martyrs are criticized: "drinking the cup of bitterness with glory is much sweeter than a carefree, long life accompanied by humiliation."

The text lists "heroes" who either "reached their destiny as martyrs" or "died for their pledge as proud heroes," including such individuals as Izz al-Din Al-Qassam, founder of the Palestinian jihadist movement and namesake of the Hamas military wing, and Khalil Al-Sakakini, a Palestinian writer and supporter of Nazi Germany who supported attacks on Jewish civilians. The text also celebrates non- Palestinian figures from Islamic history, such as Khalid ibn al-Walid (conqueror of Roman Syria), Tariq ibn Ziyad (conqueror of Visigoth Spain), and Qutuz (defender of Egypt against the Mongols), who are primarily known for their military exploits against non-Muslims, as well as anticolonial militants from the Arab world, such as Sultan Pasha al-Atrash (Syria), Omar al-Mukhtar (Libya), and Houari Boumédiène (Algeria). Comprehension questions about the text also mention Palestinian militant Dalal al-Mughrabi, perpetrator of the 1978 Coastal Road Massacre that killed thirty-eight Israelis, including thirteen children, on a civilian bus; she was listed alongside Al-Qassam and Al-Sakakini in earlier versions of the text itself.

مَرْحى لِلْأَبْطالِ

(المُؤَلِّفونَ)

بَيْنَ يَدَي النَّصِّ

لِلْأَبْطالِ مَكانَةٌ كَبيرَةٌ في كُلِّ أُمَّةٍ؛ فَهُمُ الَّذينَ يُضَحّونَ بِالنَّفْسِ وَالمالِ؛ وَلِذا خَلَدَ ذِكْرُهُمْ، وَاعْتَزَّ النّاسُ بِهِمْ، وَكُلُّ أُمَّةٍ تَفْخَرُ بِأَبْطالِها- وَالنّاسُ وَإِنِ اخْتلفوا في أَشْياءَ كَثيرَةٍ- فَهُمْ يَتَّفِقونَ جَميعاً عَلى الاعْتِزازِ بِأَبْطالِهِمْ؛ إِذْ لَوْلاهُمْ لَهانَتِ الأُمَمُ.

القِراءَةُ

نَفْتَخِرُ بِهِم، وَنَتَغَنّى بِأَمْجادِهِم، وَنَدْرُسُ سِيَرَهُم، وَنُسَمّي أَوْلادَنا بِأَسْمائِهِم، وَنُطْلِقُ أَسماءَهُم عَلى الشَّوارِعِ وَالمَيادينِ، وَالمَعالِمِ الحَضارِيَّةِ، نُعَطِّرُ بِذِكْرِهِمُ المَجالِسَ، وَيَتَمَنّى كُلٌّ مِنّا أَنْ يَكونَ مِثْلَهُم، فَقَدْ زَيَّنوا صَفَحاتِ التّاريخِ، وَعَلَّموا النّاسَ أَنَّ شُرْبَ كَأْسِ الحَنْظَلِ مَعَ العِزِّ أَلَذُّ بِكَثيرٍ مِنْ حَياةٍ رَغيدَةٍ مَديدَةٍ يُصاحِبُها ذُلٌّ، فَصَنَعوا لِلْأُمَّةِ تاريخاً مَجيداً...إِنَّهُمُ الأَبْطالُ.

مَنْ مِنّا يَنْسى خالِدَ بنَ الوَليدِ، وَأُمَّ عُمارَةَ، وَخَوْلَةَ بِنْتَ الأَزْوَرِ، وَطارِقَ بنَ زِيادٍ، وَصَلاحَ الدّينِ الأَيوبيَّ، وَقُطُزَ، وَعُمَرَ المُخْتارَ، وَسُلْطان باشا الأَطْرَش، وَعِزَّ الدّينِ القَسّام، وَهَواري بومَدْيَن، وَياسِرَ عَرَفات، وَمَيّ زِيادَة، وَخَليل السَّكاكيني، وَغَيْرَهُمْ مِنْ هذهِ الأَقمارِ الَّتي لا تَغيبُ، وَالَّتي تُضيءُ العَتَمَةَ في لَيالينا الحالِكَةِ؟ هؤُلاءِ جَميعاً احتَضَنَهُم وَطَنُنا الكَبيرُ قَديماً وَحَديثاً مِنْ فِلَسْطينَ إِلى مِصْرَ وَليبْيا، وُصولاً إِلى الأَنْدَلُسِ.

هؤُلاءِ الأَبْطالُ تاجُ أُمَّتِهِم، وَهُمْ عُنْوانُ مَجْدِها، وَهُمْ خَيْرُ مَنْ جادَ، وَخَيْرُ مَنْ أَعْطَى؛ حَمَلوا أَرْواحَهُم عَلَى راحاتِهِم، وَأَلْقَوْا بِها في المَخاطِرِ، ما خارَتْ لَهُمْ عَزيمَةٌ، وَما ضَعُفوا، وَما اسْتَكانوا، مِنْهُمْ مَنْ قَضَى شَهيداً، وَمِنْهُم مَنْ ماتَ عَلى العَهْدِ بَطَلاً أَبِيّاً.

وَهذِهِ التَّضْحِياتُ وَالبُطولاتُ الَّتي قَدَّموها لَمْ تَكُنْ لِمآرِبَ شَخْصِيَّةٍ، فَما تَرَكوا وَراءَهُم ثَرْوَةً، وَلا عَقاراً، بَلْ كانَتْ في سَبيلِ رِسالَتِهِمْ، وَشُعوبِهِم وَأَوْطانِهِم؛ لِذا اسْتَحَقّوا أَنْ يَكونوا أَبْطالاً، يُخَلِّدُهُمُ التّاريخُ، وَأَنْ يَظَلَّ ذِكْرُهُم مِسْكًا فَوّاحاً، فَمَرْحَى لَهُم، وَأُفٍّ لِلْجُبَناءِ!

- سِيَرَهُم: تاريخ حياتِهِم.
- الحَنْظَلِ: نَباتٍ شَديدِ المَرارَةِ.
- رَغيدَةٍ: هانِئَةٍ.
- الحالِكَةِ: شَديدَةِ الظُّلْمَةِ.
- راحاتِهِم: مُفْرَدُها راحَةٌ، وَتَعْني باطِنَ اليَدِ.
- خارَتْ: ضَعُفَتْ.
- اسْتَكانوا: ضَعُفوا وَذَلّوا.
- أَبِيّاً: رافِضاً لِلذُّلِّ.
- عَقاراً: أَرْضاً أَو داراً.
- مِسْكاً: نَوْعاً مِنَ العُطورِ.
- مَرْحى: تَحِيَّةٌ.

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

Hooray for the Heroes

The [textbook] authors

Heroes have a great place in every nation; they are the ones who sacrifice their lives and property. Therefore, their memory is made immortal, and people take pride in them. Every nation is proud of its heroes, and people, who may differ on many issues, all agree on taking pride in their heroes, because if not for them, nations would be disgraced.

We feel pride in them; we sing their praises, and study their life stories; we give their names to our children, and name our streets, squares, and cultural landmarks after them. We perfume our gatherings with their memory, and each of us wishes to be like them; they adorn the pages of history. They taught people that drinking the cup of bitterness with glory is much sweeter than a carefree, long life accompanied by humiliation. They made glorious history for the nation. They are the heroes.

Who among us will forget Khalid ibn al-Walid, Umm Ammarah, Khawlah bint Al-Azwar, Tariq ibn Ziyad, Saladin, Qutuz, Omar al-Mukhtar, Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, Izz al-Din Al-Qassam, Houari Boumédiène, Yasir Arafat, May Ziadeh, Khalil Al-Sakakini, and others of these moons that never set, which light the darkness of our black nights? These are all embraced by our great [Arab] homeland, ancient and modern, from Palestine to Egypt and Libya, all the way to Andalusia.

These heroes are the crown of their nation; they are the epitome of its glory. They were the best of generous people, the best givers. They carried their lives in the palms of their hands, and cast them into danger. Their determination never weakened, they never tired, or surrendered. Some reached their destiny as martyrs; others died for their pledge as proud heroes.

These sacrifices and heroic acts which they offered, were not for personal gain, and indeed, they left behind neither wealth nor real estate. Rather, it was all for the sake of their cause, their people, and their homeland. Therefore, they deserve to be called heroes, immortalized by history, and their memory lingers as fragrant musk. Hooray for them, and down with the cowards!

(p. 20)

التَّدْريباتُ:

◄ **أَوَّلاً-** نَقْرَأُ الفِقْرَةَ الآتِيَةَ، وَنَسْتَخْرِجُ مِنْها الأَسْماءَ (العَلَمَ، وَالضَّميرَ):

نَحْنُ لا نَنْسى خالِدَ بْنَ الوَليدِ، وَأُمَّ عُمارَةَ، وَخَوْلَةَ بِنْتَ الأَزْوَرِ، وَطارِقَ بْنَ زِيادٍ، وَصَلاحَ الدّينِ الأَيّوبِيَّ، وَقُطُزَ، وَعُمَرَ المُخْتارِ، وَعِزَّ الدّينِ القَسّام، وَدَلالَ المَغْرِبِيّ، وَياسِرَ عَرَفات، فَهؤُلاءِ جَميعاً تاجُ الأُمَّةِ، وَعُنْوانُ المَجْدِ، وَهُمْ خَيْرُ مَنْ جادَ، وَخَيْرُ مَنْ أَعْطى.

Exercises:
1. Let's read the following passage, and find nouns (proper nouns and pronouns) inside it:
"We do not forget Khalid ibn al-Walid, Umm Ammarah, Khawlah bint al-Azwar, Tariq ibn Ziyad, Saladin, Qutuz, Omar al-Mukhtar, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, Dalal al-Mughrabi, and Yasir Arafat, for they are the crown of their nation; they are the epitome of its glory. They were the best of generous people, the best givers."

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

(p. 28)

◀ نَقْرَأُ الفِقْرَةَ الآتِيَةَ، وَنُلاحِظُ الأَسْماءَ المُلَوَّنَةَ بِاللَّوْنِ الأَحْمَرِ:

مَنْ يَنْسى خالِداً بنَ الوَليدِ، وَأُمَّ عُمارَةَ نُسَيْبَةَ بِنْتَ كَعْبٍ الأَنْصارِيَّةَ، وَدَلالَ المُغْرَبِيّ، وَياسِرَ عَرَفات، وَغَيْرَهُمْ مِنَ الأَقْمارِ الَّتي لا تَغيبُ، وَالَّتي تُضيءُ العَتْمَةَ في اللَّيالي الحالِكَةِ؟ هؤُلاءِ جَميعاً احْتَضَنَهُمُ الوَطَنُ العَرَبِيُّ الكَبيرُ قَديماً وَحَديثاً.

We will read the following paragraph and observe the nouns colored in [colored in the original text] red:
Who among us will forget Khalid ibn al-Walid, Umm Ammarah Nusaybah bint Ka'b Al-Ansariyyah, Dalal al-Mughrabi, Yasir Arafat ,and others of these moons that never set, which light the darkness of the black nights? These are all embraced by the great Arab homeland, ancient and modern.

Example 2.

***Arabic Language,* Grade 8, Vol. 2, 2021–2025, pp. 40–44 (Previously: *Arabic Language*, Grade 8, Vol. 2, 2020, pp. 40–44)**

A reading comprehension text for Grade 8 is taught through a violent and graphic story, exalting the feats of Palestinian militants in the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Palestinian fighters are described as having their "daggers land on the necks of the Enemy soldiers." Additional graphic details lionize suicide fighters (*Fedayeen*) describing them as using "explosive belts" to "turn their bodies into fire burning the Zionist tank." The emotional impact of these graphic details is augmented by the text narrator's own reaction to them, as he comments, "we shall not forget [these sights]." Accompanying the text is an illustration of Israeli soldiers in a tank, being shot dead by a Palestinian gunman, which visualizes the glorification of violence depicted in the text. The glorification of graphic violence and self-sacrificial attacks is problematic because it presents lethal force as admirable and memorable, potentially normalizing violence as a legitimate means of resolving conflict and encouraging students to identify with violent actors rather than with peaceful alternatives.

(p. 40)

كَرامَةُ الكَرامَةِ

بَيْنَ يَدَيِ النَّصِّ:

بَعْدَ هَزيمَةِ عامِ أَلْفٍ وتِسْعِمِئَةٍ وسَبْعَةٍ وسِتينَ، وَاحْتِلالِ الضِّفَةِ الغَرْبِيَّةِ وغَزَّةَ، وسَيْطَرَةِ الاحْتلالِ الصِّهْيونِيِّ على فِلَسْطينَ جَميعِها، شَعَرَتِ الأُمَّةُ العَرَبِيَّةُ والإِسْلامِيَّةُ بِالقَهْرِ والخَيْبَةِ والخِذْلانِ، فَجاءَتْ مَعرَكَةُ الكَرامَةِ في العامِ التّالي، فَكَسَرَتْ شَوْكَةَ الجَيْشِ الصِّهْيونِيِّ؛ ما أَعادَ لِلأُمَّةِ نَوْعاً مِنَ الكَرامَةِ والثِّقَةِ بالنَّفْسِ.

The Dignity [Karāmah] *of Karameh*
About the text:
Following the 1967 defeat [i.e. the Six Day War] and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and after the Zionist Occupation took over the entirety of Palestine, the Arab and Islamic nation felt defeated, frustrated, and disappointed. Then came the Battle of Karameh the following year, which broke the spirit of the Zionist army, and that restored some measure of the nation's dignity and self-confidence.

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

(p. 41)

دَخَلَ الصَّهاينَةُ الكَرامَةَ، وَاشْتَبَكوا مَعَ الجُنودِ الأُرْدُنِيّينَ وَالفِدائِيّينَ الفِلَسْطينِيّينَ **بِالسِّلاحِ الأَبْيَضِ**، وَلَمْ تَكُنِ المَعْرَكَةُ سَهْلَةً، كَما خُيِّلَ لَهُمْ، بَلْ كانَتْ **مَلْحَمَةً** سَطَّرَ فيها مُقاتِلو الضِّفَّتَيْنِ بُطولاتٍ خارِقَةً، فَلَمْ يَسْتَطِعِ العَدُوُّ تَحْقيقَ أَهْدافِهِ الَّتي حَلَمَ بِها قَبْلَ المَعْرَكَةِ، فَأَيْقَنَ أَنَّ إِرادَةَ المُقاتِلينَ راسِخَةٌ رُسوخَ جِبالِ السَّلْطِ والقُدْسِ.

The Zionists entered Karameh and came to blows with the Jordanian soldiers and the Palestinian fedayeen with bladed weapons. The battle was not as easy as they had imagined, but a bloodbath in which the fighters of both banks [i.e. Jordanians and Palestinians] displayed extraordinary feats of heroism, and the Enemy could not realize the goals it had dreamed of before the battle. It became convinced that the will of the fighters is as firmly rooted as the mountains of Al-Salt [in Jordan] and Jerusalem.

(p. 42)

خاضَ الفِدائِيّونَ، بالرَّغْمِ مِنْ قِلَّةِ أَسْلِحَتِهِمْ، وَبُدائِيَّتِها، مَعْرَكَةَ الكَرامَةِ بِنارٍ كَثيفَةٍ مِنَ القَنابِلِ اليَدَوِيَّةِ، وَالسِّلاحِ الأَبْيَضِ، فَهَوَتْ خَناجِرُ الفِدائِيّينَ عَلى رِقابِ جُنودِ العَدُوِّ، وَحَزَّمَ بَعْضُ الفِدائِيّينَ أَنْفُسَهُمْ بِأَحْزِمَةٍ مُتَفَجِّرَةٍ، فَصارَتْ أَجْسادُهُم نيراناً حارِقَةً للدَّبّاباتِ الصِّهْيونِيَّةِ. فَكانَتْ حَرْبَ عِصاباتٍ وَشَوارِعَ ضِدَّ جَيْشٍ نِظامِيٍّ صِهْيونِيٍّ، وَامْتَدَّتِ المَعْرَكَةُ مُنْذُ ساعاتِ الصَّباحِ الباكِرِ حَتّى ساعاتِ المَساءِ، دَمَّرَتْ خِلالَها القُوّاتُ الغازِيَةُ ثَلاثَةَ أَرْباعِ مَباني قَرْيَةِ الكَرامَةِ.

اضْطُرَّ الصَّهاينَةُ أَمامَ صُمودِ المُقاتِلينَ **وَضَراوَةِ** مُقاوَمَتِهِمْ إِلى طَلَبِ وَقْفٍ سَريعٍ لِإِطْلاقِ النّارِ؛ حِفاظاً عَلى سَلامَتِهِمْ، لكِنَّ القائِدَ الأُرْدُنِيَّ مَشْهورَ حَديثَةَ وَرِفاقَهُ رَفَضوا الطَّلَبَ ما دامَ هُناكَ صِهْيونِيٌّ واحِدٌ يُدَنِّسُ أَرْضَ الكَرامَةِ. وَتَحْتَ وابِلٍ كَثيفٍ مِنْ نيرانِ الفِدائِيّينَ وَالجَيْشِ الأُرْدُنِيِّ وَتحْتَ جُنْحِ الظَّلامِ، بَدَأَتِ القُوّاتُ الغازِيَةُ تُلَمْلِمُ جُثَثَ قَتْلاها وَجَرْحاها تَمْهيداً **لِلْجَلاءِ**، وَتَتْرُكُ وَراءَها بَعْضَ الجُثَثِ **وَالأَشْلاءِ**؛ لِتَكونَ طَعاماً لِوُحوشِ الأَرْضِ وَكَواسِرِ السَّماءِ. وَانْدَحَرَتْ تَجُرُّ أَذْيالَ الهَزيمَةِ وَالخَيْبَةِ.

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

The fedayeen, despite their few primitive weapons, rushed into the Battle of Karameh with heavy fire of hand grenades and bladed weapons, and the fedayeen's daggers landed on the necks of the Enemy soldiers. Some of the fedayeen wore explosive belts, thus turning their bodies into fire burning the Zionist tanks. […]

[...] Under the shower of heavy fire from the fedayeen and the Jordanian army, and under the cover of darkness, the invading forces began gathering the bodies of its dead and injured to prepare for withdrawal, leaving behind some corpses and strewn body parts to become food for wild beasts of the earth and birds of prey in the sky. They were defeated, dragging their tails of defeat and failure.
[...]

(p. 43)

الصِّهْيونِيَّةِ المَعْطوبَةِ عَلى شاحِناتِ نَقْلٍ كَبيرَةٍ إِلى الأَرْضِ المُحْتَلَّةِ، وَتَرَكوا بَعْضاً مِنْها في ساحَةِ المَعْرَكَةِ. وَلَنْ نَنْسى صورَةَ جُنْدِيٍّ صِهْيونِيٍّ مُحْتَرِقٍ مُكَبَّلٍ مِنْ قائِدِهِ بِسَلاسِلَ غَليظَةٍ داخِلَ دَبّابَتِهِ؛ خَشْيَةَ الهَرَبِ. وَسَحَبَ الأَبْطالُ بَعْضَ الدَّبّاباتِ إِلى عَمّانَ؛ لِتَكونَ دُمىً يَلْعَبُ بِها الأَطْفالُ المُبْتَهِجونَ بِالنَّصْرِ.

We shall not forget the image of a burnt Zionist soldier, shackled by his commander in thick chains inside his tank, fearing that he might flee. The heroes hauled some of the tanks to Amman, to become toys to be played with by the children delighted from victory.

(p. 44)

المُناقَشَةُ والتَّحْليلُ

١- نُدَلِّلُ مِنَ النَّصِّ عَلى اسْتِخْفافِ الصَّهاينَةِ بِالقُوّاتِ العَرَبِيَّةِ.

٢- نُعَلِّلُ:

أ- انْتَصَرَ أَبْطالُ الكَرامَةِ، بالرَّغْمِ من قِلَّةِ عَدَدِهِم وَعَتادِهِم، عَلى القُوّاتِ الغازِيَةِ.

ب- تَسابَقَ الفِلَسْطينِيّونَ وَأَبْناءُ الأُمَّةِ العَرَبِيَّةِ؛ لِيَلْتَحِقوا بِصُفوفِ الثَّوْرَةِ.

ج- طَلَبَتِ القُوّاتُ الغازِيَةُ وَقْفَ إِطْلاقِ النّارِ.

Discussion and Analysis
1. We will draw evidence from the text that the Zionists underestimated the Arab forces.
2. We will explain why:
a- The heroes of Karameh defeated the invading forces, despite their few numbers and equipment.
b- The Palestinians and the sons of the Arab nation raced to join the ranks of the Uprising.
c- The invading forces asked for a ceasefire.

Example 3.

***Islamic Education,* Grade 9, Vol. 1, 2020–2025, p. 13 (Previously: *Islamic Education*, Grade 9, Vol. 1, 2019, p. 12)**

A ninth-grade Islamic Education textbook interprets verses from a Surah in the Qur'an as promoting violent *jihad* against "Infidels" (i.e., non-Muslims). The lesson tells students that God expects Muslims to wage war against the Infidels, so as to test their faith and give them a chance to atone for their sins should they die in battle, something that the textbook describes as an "honor" (*ikrām*). The textbook also informs students that Muslims should take prisoners from the Infidels once they are defeated and that dying while fighting the Infidels grants one an esteemed place in paradise. The lesson ends with a warning that past Infidels have been "annihilated" by God, implying that present-day Infidels will meet a similar fate. It does not attempt to contextualize the relevant Qur'anic verses as being restricted to a specific place or time nor the use of the highly incendiary term "Infidel" (*kāfir*), which may apply to any non-Muslim. Instead, the lesson seems to treat the verses as timeless instructions for how the Muslim community should conduct itself vis-à-vis what are described as the "Enemies." The lesson thus strongly insinuates that holy war against non-Muslims is an applicable, potentially desirable course of action in the present and future, and that Palestinian students should not be afraid to seek death in such conflicts.



تناوَلَتْ الآياتُ الكريمةُ السابقة الأمورَ الآتية:

- إعلانَ الحَربِ على الكفّارِ الّذينَ لا عَهْدَ لَهُم ولا ذِمَّة، والذين يُحارِبونَ دينَ اللّهِ تعالى ويَمنعونَ النّاسَ مِنَ الدُّخولِ فيه، فأمرَ اللّه المؤمنينَ بِجِهادِهم والغِلْظَةِ عليهم حتّى قَهْرِهِم وَإضعافِهِم وَهزيمتِهِم.
- إرشادَ اللّهِ تعالى المسلمينَ إذا انتصروا على عدوِّهم وأَضْعفوهم أن يأسِروا منهم، ويُحْسِنوا لأسراهم فلا يَقتلُوا أحداً منهُم، فقد اعتبرَ الإسلامُ الإحسانَ إلى الأسيرِ كالإحسانِ إلى اليتيم. فالإسلامُ ليسَ مُتَعَطِّشاً إلى سَفْكِ الدِّماءِ وقَتْلِ النّاسِ، إنّما يأمرُ بقتالِ مَن يُقاتِلُ المُسلمينَ وَيَصُدُّ عَن دينِ اللّهِ.
- دَعوةَ المسلمينَ إلى أَخْذِ الأسرى بعدَ إلحاقِ الهَزيمَةِ بالكفّارِ، وَالتّعامُل معهم بأحدِ أمرَيْن، هما:
  ١- المَنُّ عليهم، والتّفضُّلُ بإطلاقِ سَراحِهِم مِن غيرِ مُقابل.
  ٢- إطلاقُ سراحِهِم مُقابلَ فِديةٍ من المالِ، أو مُقابلَ تَبادلِ الأسرى، أو مُقابلَ مَنفعةٍ يَراها المسلمون.

نشـــاط:
أقارنُ بين معاملة المسلمين للأسير ومعاملة غيرِهِم.

الحكمة من قتالِ الكفّار:

أخبرَ اللّهُ تعالى أنّهُ قادِرٌ على إهلاكِ الأعداءِ وَقتْلِهِم، إلا أنّهُ أمرَ بِمُقاتلتِهِم؛ لِحِكَمٍ عَديدةٍ، منها:
١- أنَّ اللّهَ تعالى يُريدُ أنْ يُميّزَ بينَ الصادقينَ وَغيرِهِم من المنافقين في مُقاتَلةِ الكُفّارِ.
٢- أنَّ اللّهَ تعالى يُريدُ أنْ يَتّخِذَ مِن المُؤمنينَ شُهداءَ يُكْرِمُهم بالشّهادَةِ؛ لِيغْفِرَ ذُنوبَهُم، وَيرفعَ دَرجاتِهِم في الجنّةِ، قالَ تعالى: ﴿ وَٱلشُّهَدَآءُ عِندَ رَبِّهِمْ لَهُمْ أَجْرُهُمْ وَنُورُهُمْ ﴾ (الحديد: ١٩) قالَ رَسُولُ اللّهِ ﷺ: "وَإِنَّ أَرْوَاحَهُمْ فِي جَوْفِ طَيْرٍ خُضْرٍ تَسْرَحُ فِي الْجَنَّةِ حَيْثُ شَاءَتْ، ثُمَّ تَأْوِي إِلَى قَنَادِيلَ تَحْتَ الْعَرْشِ"[١].

بيان عاقبة المؤمنين وعاقبة الكافرين:

قال تعالى: ﴿ يَٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓاْ إِن تَنصُرُواْ ٱللَّهَ يَنصُرْكُمْ وَيُثَبِّتْ أَقْدَامَكُمْ ۝٧ وَٱلَّذِينَ كَفَرُواْ فَتَعْسًا لَّهُمْ وَأَضَلَّ أَعْمَٰلَهُمْ ۝٨ ذَٰلِكَ بِأَنَّهُمْ كَرِهُواْ مَآ أَنزَلَ ٱللَّهُ فَأَحْبَطَ أَعْمَٰلَهُمْ ۝٩ أَفَلَمْ يَسِيرُواْ فِى ٱلْأَرْضِ فَيَنظُرُواْ كَيْفَ كَانَ عَٰقِبَةُ ٱلَّذِينَ مِن قَبْلِهِمْ دَمَّرَ ٱللَّهُ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلِلْكَٰفِرِينَ أَمْثَٰلُهَا ۝١٠ ذَٰلِكَ بِأَنَّ

١- رواه مسلم.

١٣

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

ٱللَّهَ مَوْلَى ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُواْ وَأَنَّ ٱلْكَٰفِرِينَ لَا مَوْلَىٰ لَهُمْ ﴿١١﴾.

وَعَدَ اللّهُ تعالى المؤمنينَ بالعِزَّةِ والنّصْرِ والثّباتِ أمامَ عَدُوِّهِم إنْ هم أَطاعوهُ، وَطبّقوا شَريعَتَه، واجتنبوا معاصيه، فقد أذَلَّ اللّهُ تعالى الكُفّارَ، وأَبطلَ أعمالَهُم؛ لِكُفرِهِم وَعَدائِهِم وَبُغضِهِم كتابَ اللّهِ وشريعتَه. فعلى الكُفّارِ أنْ يَتّعظوا بما أصابَ الأمَمَ السّابقة، فقد أهلَكَهُم بكفرِهم، ودمَّرَ قُراهُم، ولم يكُنْ لهم ناصرٌ يمنعُ عنهم عذابَ اللّهِ تعالى.

The above Holy Verses discuss the following issues:

Declaring war on Infidels who have no treaty signed ['ahd] and no contract of protection [dimmah], who wage war against the Religion of God Almighty and prevent people from joining it; God commands to wage jihad *against them and to treat them harshly, until they are subdued, weakened, and defeated.*

God Almighty directs Muslims, should they be victorious over their Enemy and have them weakened, to take some of them prisoner and to treat those prisoners well, and not kill them. […]

Calling on Muslims to take prisoners after defeating the Infidels […]

Activity:
I'll compare how Muslims treat prisoners versus how others treat them.

The Reasoning behind Fighting the Infidels:

God Almighty has made it known that He is capable of annihilating and killing the Enemies [Himself], yet He commands [Muslims] to fight them, for several reasons, including:

1. God wishes to distinguish between the truthful and others, the Hypocrites [pretending to be faithful], by having them fight the Infidels.

2. God wishes to take martyrs from amongst the Faithful, and honor them with martyrdom, so as to forgive their sins and raise their rank in Paradise. The Almighty said: "and the martyrs with their Lord; for them is their reward and their light" (57:19). The Messenger of God, peace be upon him, said: "Their souls are in the inside of green birds roaming freely in Paradise where they please, then taking shelter in lanterns suspended from the throne." (Recited by Muslim)

The end of the Faithful, and the end of the Infidels:
The Almighty said: […]
God Almighty promises the Faithful glory, victory, and strength when facing their Enemy, so long as they obey Him […] God Almighty has brought the Infidels humiliation and rendered their [good] deeds invalid, because of their Unbelief, hostility and hatred towards the Book of God and His shariah. The Infidels must take warning from what befell previous nations, as He annihilated them for their unbelief and destroyed their towns, and they had no aid to prevent the punishment of God Almighty.

Example 4.

***Islamic Education,* Grade 5, Vol. 2, 2020–2025, pp. 74–79 (Previously: *Islamic Education*, Grade 5, Vol. 2, 2019, pp. 74–79)**

Palestinian girls are encouraged to kill, be killed, and send their children to die in a chapter that discusses the role of women in combat at the time of the inception of Islam. It focuses on three women: the first woman who died in the name of Islam; a woman who stabbed a Jew to death, stating that she served "rightfully so, a model of a Muslim woman brave in defense of Muslims"; and a woman who praises God after her four children died in the battlefield while performing jihad. Students are told they should "emulate" these figures and "draw lessons" from their stories; furthermore, the topic for discussion offered at the end of the lesson is "the role of the Palestinian woman in charity and resilience when facing the Zionist Occupation," making a connection between these women of early Islam and the current conflict with Israel.

الدّرس ١٤

من صحابيّات رسول الله ﷺ

الأهداف:

يُتوقّعُ من الطّلبة بعد نهاية الدّرس أن يكونوا قادرين على:

١- ذكر بعض صحابيّات رسول الله ﷺ.
٢- التّعريف بكلٍّ من (سميّة بنت خيّاط، وصفيّة بنت عبد المطّلب، والخنساء، رضي الله عنهنّ).
٣- بيان دور كلٍّ من (صفيّة، وسميّة، والخنساء، رضي الله عنهنّ) في خدمة الإسلام.
٤- استنتاج الدّروس والعِبَر من مواقفهنّ.

Lesson 14:
Some of the Female Companions of the Messenger of God (PBUH)
Lesson goals:
By lesson's end, students are expected to be able to:
[...]
2. Become acquainted with Sumayyah bint Khayyat, Safiyyah bint Abd al-Muttalib, and Al-Khansaa, God be pleased with them.
[…]
4. Draw lessons and morals from the situations they were in.

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

(p. 75-77)

الصّحابيّة سميّة بنت خيّاط (أوّل شهيدة في الإسلام):

كان كفّار قريش يأخذونها وزوجَها وابنَها إلى الصحراء، ويلقونهم على الرمال الحارّة، ويقومون بضربهم، وتعذيبهم بأقسى أنواع التّعذيب، ويمرّ الرّسول ﷺ عليهم، ويقول: "صبراً آل ياسر، فإنّ موعدكم الجنّة" (حسن صحيح)، وكان الكفّار يطلبون منها أن تُشرك باللّه عزّ وجلّ، وتسبّ الإسلام، والرّسول ﷺ، لكنّها بقيت ثابتة على الإسلام، ترفض أن تلفظَ كلمة الكفر، أو تذكرَ الرّسول ﷺ بسوء، فغضب الكفّار من ثباتها، وصبرها، فجاء أبو جهل بحربة، وطعنها حتّى استُشهدت، وهي تشهد أنْ لا إله إلّا اللّه، وأنّ محمّداً رسول اللّه، صابرة ثابتة شُجاعة، دون خوف أو وَجَل، فكانت أوّل شهيدة في الإسلام.

ولمّا وقعت معركة بدرٍ، وقُتِلَ فيها أبو جهلٍ، قال النّبيّ ﷺ لعمّارِ بن ياسر: "قتل اللّهُ قاتِلَ أمّكَ". (إسناده صحيح)

الصّحابيّة صفيّة بنت عبد المطّلب، رضي اللّه عنها:

هي عمّة الرّسول ﷺ، وشقيقة الصّحابيّ حمزة بن عبد المطّلب سيّد الشّهداء، رضي اللّه عنه، أسلمت، وبايعت -رضي اللّه عنها- الرّسول ﷺ في بداية الدّعوة، وهاجرت إلى المدينة المنورة، وقاتلت يوم أُحُد، وتُوُفّيت في خلافة عمر بن الخطّاب ﷺ سنة عشرين للهجرة، وكان عُمُرُها ٧٣ سنة، ودُفِنَت في البقيع.

مواقف من حياة صفيّة، رضي اللّه عنها:

١- ثباتها في غزوة أُحُد مع عدد قليل من الصّحابة، رضي اللّه عنهم.

الرّجوع، فقالت: "لأصبِرَنّ، وأحتسبَنّ إنْ شاء اللّه" فلمّا رأته نظرت إليه، وصلّت عليه، واستغفرتْ له، ثُمّ دُفِنَ في أرض المعركة.

٣- في غزوة الخندق، رأت يهودياً يطوف حول حِصن المسلمين بالقرب من النّساء، يريد أن يعتديَ على المسلمين، فنزلت إليه بعمود خيمتها، وهجمت عليه، وقتلته، فكانت -بحقٍّ- مثالاً للمرأة المسلمة الشُّجاعة في الدّفاع عن المسلمين.

الصّحابيّة الخنساء، رضي اللّه عنها:

هي تُماضِرُ بنت عمرو، رضي اللّه عنها، لقبُها الخنساء، عُرِفَتْ بالصّبر، والشّجاعة، واشتُهِرَت بنظم الشّعر، وخاصّة رثاؤها لأخَوَيْها صخرٍ، ومعاويةَ.

قَدِمَتِ الخنساء على النّبيّ ﷺ مع قومها من بني سُلَيم، فأسلمت معهم، ولمّا نادى منادي الجهاد؛ للدّفاع عن الدّين، ونشر الإسلام، جمعت أولادها الأربعة، وشجّعتهم على القتال، والجهاد في سبيل اللّه، وودّعتهم، فجاهدوا في سبيل اللّه، واستُشهدوا جميعاً في المعركة، ولمّا بلغَها نبأُ استشهادِهم، صبرَت، واحتسبَت، وحمدَتِ اللّه تعالى، وقالت بثبات وعزيمة: "الحمد لله الّذي شرّفني باستشهادهم، وإنّي أسألُ اللّه أن يجمعَني معهم في مستقرّ رحمته".

قَضِيَّةٌ للنِّقاش:

أَتَحَدَّثُ عَنْ دَوْرِ المَرْأَةِ الفِلَسْطِينِيَّةِ في العَطاءِ، وَالصُّمودِ في مُواجَهَةِ الاحْتِلالِ الصّهيونيّ.

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

The Female Companion of the Prophet, Sumayyah bint Khayyat (the First Female Martyr in Islam):
[…]
The Infidels kept on asking [Sumayyah] to worship deities other than Allah Almighty and curse Islam and the Messenger (PBUH), but she remained persistent in her faith in Islam, refusing to utter a word of unbelief or speak ill of the Messenger (PBUH). The Infidels were thus angered by her persistence and perseverance, and so came [the Infidel] Abu Jahl with a spear, and stabbed her until she fell as a martyr, while she was testifying that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah. She was steadfast, persistent, and brave, and felt neither fear or dread; she was the first female martyr in Islam.
[…]

The Female Companion of the Prophet, Safiyyah bint Abd al-Muttalib, God be pleased with her:
[…]
Situations from Safiyyah's life, God be pleased with her:
[…]
3. During the Battle of the Trench [in 627 AD], [Safiyyah] saw a Jew circling the Muslims' fortress, near the women, wishing to attack the Muslims. She came down to him with a pole from her tent, attacked and killed him. She was – and rightfully so – a model of a Muslim woman brave in defense of Muslims.

The Female Companion of the Prophet, Al-Khansaa, God be pleased with her:

[…]

Al-Khansaa came to the Prophet (PBUH) with her people of the Banu Sulaym [tribe] and embraced Islam with them. When the call for jihad *came out, to defend the Faith and spread Islam, she gathered her four children, encouraged them to fight and carry out* jihad *for the sake of Allah, and bid them farewell. They thus set out in* jihad *for the sake of Allah, and all fell in battle as martyrs. When news of their martyrdom reached her, she persevered, anticipated Allah's reward, and praised Allah Almighty. She said, steady and resolute: "Praise be to Allah, Who honored me with their martyrdom. I pray to Allah that He joins me with them in the Abiding Abode of His mercy."*

Topic for Discussion:
I will discuss the role of Palestinian women in charity and resilience when facing the Zionist Occupation.

(p. 78)



لافِتَة: إيماني يَدْعوني أَنْ أُحِبَّ صَحابَةَ رَسولِ اللهِ ﷺ، وَأَقْتدي بِسيرَتِهِمِ العَطِرَةِ.

التقويم

السؤال الأول أضعُ إشارةَ (✓) يمينَ العبارةِ الصّحيحةِ، وإشارةَ (✗) يمينَ العبارةِ غيرِ الصّحيحةِ، فيما يأتي:

أ- ( ) الصّحابيّة الّتي كانت سابع سبعة دخلوا الإسلام في مكّة هي سميّة بنت خيّاط.

ب- ( ) الصحابية صفية بنت عبد المطلب ﷺ هي عمة الرسول ﷺ.

ج- ( ) صفيّة بنت عبد المطّلب قتلتْ يهوديّاً أراد الاعتداء على المسلمين.

Banner: My faith calls upon me to love the Companions of the Messenger of God (PBUH), and I will emulate their glorious lives.

Assessment:
Question 1: I will place a checkmark next to a correct statement, and an X next to an incorrect statement:
[...]
C. ( ) Safiyyah bint Abd al-Muttalib killed a Jew who wished to attack the Muslims.

(p. 79)



[…]
Question 5: Based on the situations the female Companions of the Prophet were in, what is women's role in the battlefield?
[…]

Example 5.

***Islamic Education,* Grade 8, Vol. 2, 2020–2025, pp. 49–52 (Previously: *Islamic Education*, Grade 8, Vol. 2, 2018, pp. 49–52)**

A chapter in an Islamic studies textbook is dedicated to celebrating violent jihad. Students are to understand that violent jihad is well supported both by the Qur'an and other canonical Islamic sources. Students are to become acquainted with the terms "jihad," "jihad fighter" (*mujāhid*), and "martyr" (*šahīd*), and learn that performing jihad, especially dying in battle, carries with it many rewards, both for themselves and for the community. At the end of the lesson, questions introduced in the 2020 textbook prompt students to learn more about historic instances of jihad in Palestine, specifically, by Companions of the Prophet (against the Byzantines) and Saladin (against the Crusaders), underscoring the idea that jihad is to be understood as a holy war against non-Muslims and that it is a part of Palestinian heritage and identity. The chapter does not offer a nonviolent interpretation of jihad.

الدَّرسُ التّاسع

مَن قَاتَلَ لِتَكُونَ كلمةُ اللَّهِ هِيَ العُلْيَا

(درس تفاعلي)

الأهداف:

يُتَوَقَّعُ منَ الطّلبة في نهايةِ الدّرسِ:

- قراءة الحديث الشريف قراءة سليمة.
- شرح الحديث الشريف شرحاً إجمالياً.
- توضيح المعاني المستفادة من الحديث الشريف.
- حفظ الحديث الشريف غيباً.
- التعرف إلى مفهومي: المجاهد، الشهيد.
- استنتاج ارتباط الأعمال بالنيات.
- الحرص على إعلاء كلمة الله عز وجل.

Lesson Nine
He who Battles so the Word of God be Supreme (Interactive Lesson)

Lesson goals:
By the end of the lesson, students are expected to:
[…]
*Become acquainted with the terms "*jihad *fighter" [*mujāhid*] and "martyr" [*šahīd*].*
[…]

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

عَـن أَبِـي مُوسَـى الأَشـعَرِيِّ – رَضِـيَ اللَّـهُ عَنـهُ – قَـالَ: «جَـاءَ رَجُـلٌ إِلَـى النَبِـيِّ (ﷺ)، فَقَـالَ: الرَجُـلُ يُقَاتِـلُ لِلمَغنَـمِ، وَالرَجُـلُ يُقَاتِـلُ لِلذِكـرِ، وَالرَجُـلُ يُقَاتِـلُ لِيُـرَى مَكَانـهُ، فَمَـن فِـي سَـبِيلِ اللّـهِ؟ قَـالَ: مَـن قَاتَـلَ لِتَكُـونَ كَلِمَـةُ اللَّـهِ هِـيَ العُلَيَـا فَهُـوَ فِـي سَـبِيلِ اللـهِ»

(رواه البخاري).

يُنَاقِشُ المُعَلِّمُ الطَلَبَةَ فِي المَوَاضِيعِ وَالأَفكَارِ وَالمَفَاهِيمِ الآتِيَةِ:

١. مفهوم كل من: الجِهَاد، المُجَاهِد، الشَهِيد.
٢. الأدلة على الجِهَادِ مِنَ القُرآنِ الكَرِيمِ، وَمِنَ السُنَّةِ النَبَوِيَّةِ المُشَرَّفَةِ.
٣. بيان أثر الجِهَادِ عَلَى الفَردِ وَالمُجتَمَعِ.
٤. تعداد ثَوَابَ المُجَاهِدِ وَالشَهِيدِ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّه.
٥. تحديدُ غَايَاتِ الجِهَادِ فِي الإسلامِ.
٦. استحضار مَوَاقِفَ جِهَادِيَّةً لِلصَحَابَةِ – رِضوَانُ اللَّهِ عَلَيهِم -.
٧. أهمية إِخلاصِ النِيَّةِ فِي الجِهَادِ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ – عَزَّ وَجَلَّ -، وَفِي كُلِّ عَمَلٍ.

Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, God be pleased with him, narrated that a man came to the Prophet and said, "One man fights for booty, one for the reputation of fighting, and one for his degree [of bravery] to be seen; which of them is in God's path?" He replied, "The one who fights that God's word may have preeminence is in God's path." (From Al-Bukhari)

The teacher will discuss the following subjects, ideas. and concepts with students:
1. The following concepts: jihad, jihad *fighter, martyr.*

قَالَ تَعَالَىٰ: ﴿كُتِبَ عَلَيْكُمُ ٱلْقِتَالُ وَهُوَ كُرْهٌ لَّكُمْ ۖ وَعَسَىٰٓ أَن تَكْرَهُوا۟ شَيْـًٔا وَهُوَ خَيْرٌ لَّكُمْ ۖ وَعَسَىٰٓ أَن تُحِبُّوا۟ شَيْـًٔا وَهُوَ شَرٌّ لَّكُمْ ۚ وَٱللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ وَأَنتُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ ﴿٢١٦﴾﴾ (البقرة: ٢١٦)

قَالَ تَعَالَىٰ: ﴿وَقَٰتِلُوهُمْ حَتَّىٰ لَا تَكُونَ فِتْنَةٌ وَيَكُونَ ٱلدِّينُ لِلَّهِ ۖ فَإِنِ ٱنتَهَوْا۟ فَلَا عُدْوَٰنَ إِلَّا عَلَى ٱلظَّٰلِمِينَ

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)



نصـوص شـرعيّة

قَالَ تَعَالَىٰ: ﴿وَأَعِدُّوا۟ لَهُم مَّا ٱسْتَطَعْتُم مِّن قُوَّةٍ وَمِن رِّبَاطِ ٱلْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَ بِهِۦ عَدُوَّ ٱللَّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ وَءَاخَرِينَ مِن دُونِهِمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ ٱللَّهُ يَعْلَمُهُمْ ۚ وَمَا تُنفِقُوا۟ مِن شَىْءٍ فِى سَبِيلِ ٱللَّهِ يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنتُمْ لَا تُظْلَمُونَ ﴿٦٠﴾﴾ (الأنفال: ٦٠)

قَالَ تَعَالَىٰ: ﴿وَمَا لَكُمْ لَا تُقَٰتِلُونَ فِى سَبِيلِ ٱللَّهِ وَٱلْمُسْتَضْعَفِينَ مِنَ ٱلرِّجَالِ وَٱلنِّسَآءِ وَٱلْوِلْدَٰنِ ٱلَّذِينَ يَقُولُونَ رَبَّنَآ أَخْرِجْنَا مِنْ هَٰذِهِ ٱلْقَرْيَةِ ٱلظَّالِمِ أَهْلُهَا وَٱجْعَل لَّنَا مِن لَّدُنكَ وَلِيًّا وَٱجْعَل لَّنَا مِن لَّدُنكَ نَصِيرًا ﴿٧٥﴾﴾ (النساء: ٧٥)

قَالَ تَعَالَىٰ: ﴿وَلَا تَحْسَبَنَّ ٱلَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا۟ فِى سَبِيلِ ٱللَّهِ أَمْوَٰتًۢا ۚ بَلْ أَحْيَآءٌ عِندَ رَبِّهِمْ يُرْزَقُونَ ﴿١٦٩﴾﴾ (آل عمران: ١٦٩)

Shariah *texts*

The Almighty said: "Battle has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you. But perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah knows, while you know not." (2:216)

The Almighty said: "Fight them until there is no (more) fitnah [infighting] and (until) religion (i.e., worship) is (acknowledged to be) for Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression (i.e., assault) except against the oppressors." (2:193)

The Almighty said: "Permission (to fight) has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory." (22:39)

The Almighty said: "And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know (but) whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged." (8:60)

The Almighty said: "And what is (the matter) with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and (for) the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, 'Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper'?" (4:75)

The Almighty said: "And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision." (3:169)

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

١ بِالتَعَاونِ مَعَ أفراد مَجمُوعَتِي أَكتُبُ غَايَاتِ الجِهَادِ فِي سبيل اللّهِ.

٢ أَبحَثُ عَن مواقف جهادية لشهداء من الصحابة في فلسطين، وَأكتُبُهَا فِي دَفتَرِي.

٣ أَذكُرُ مَوقِفاً جِهَادِيّاً لِلقائِدِ صَلاحِ الدِّينِ الأيوبي – رَحِمَهُ اللّهِ تعالى -.

التّقويم النوعي

١- يصمم المعلم ورقة عمل تتضمن المفاهيم الواردة في الدرس (الشهيد، المجاهد، الإخلاص، الجهاد).

٢- يلاحظ المعلم تلاوة الطلبة للنصوص الشرعية الواردة في الدرس تلاوة صحيحة وفق أحكام التجويد.

٣- يلاحظ المعلم قراءة الطلبة للحديث الشريف.

٤- يكلف المعلم الطلبة باستنتاج أمور أرشد إليها الحديث الشريف.

٥- يكلف المعلم الطلبة باستخلاص غايات الجهاد من النصوص الشرعية.

Activity:
1. In collaboration with my team members, I will write down the goals of jihad *in God's path.*
2. I will research jihad *situations faced by Companions of the Prophet who fell as martyrs in Palestine, and write them down in my notebook.*
3. I will mention a jihad *situation faced by commander Saladin al-Ayyubi, God rest his soul.*

Qualitative assessment

Example 6.

***Islamic Education,* Grade 5, Vol. 2, 2020–2025, pp. 69–70 (Previously: *Islamic Education*, Grade 5, Vol. 2, 2019, p. 69–70)**

The story of the torture and death of a celebrated Islamic figure is used in a Grade 5 textbook to glorify violence, elevate death and martyrdom for religious and political goals, and endorse revenge killing of whole groups of people, all implicitly in the context of the present-day conflict. In a lesson on selected Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, this Islamic Education textbook describes events from the life story of Khubayb bin ʻAdiyy, an early seventh-century Companion of the Prophet, who was captured in battle and executed by the pagan Arabian tribe of Quraysh. The text favorably mentions Khubayb's active role fighting in battle alongside the Prophet, his enduring physical torture in captivity, and the fact that he is traditionally believed to have composed the Islamic martyr's prayer.

The text also pronounces Khubayb himself as a martyr (*šahīd*) of Islam who was crucified and killed while suffering excruciating pain for the sake of Allah. Prominently quoting the famous martyr's prayer attributed to Khubayb, "When I am killed as a Muslim, I do not care, as long as my death is for the sake of Allah," the text defines being killed in battle for religious ends as a highly desirable sort of death. In addition, the textbook quotes Khubayb cursing his adversaries as he dies: "O Allah, [...] kill them one by one, and spare not any one of them." This informs students that killing others–possibly to the extent of annihilating all individuals from a group of people defined as adversarial–is a divinely sanctioned, legitimate solution for intergroup conflicts. Immediately after reading the text, the students are asked to tell a story of a martyr from their own community who was killed "in defense of the Faith and their Palestinian homeland." As a concluding exercise, this activity creates an immediate connection between the violent and potentially suicidal–or even genocidal– messages embedded in Khubayb's story and students' current lived reality. Thus, the textbook glorifies and may even encourage acts of violence and death for religious and political ends.



الصّحابيّ خُبَيبُ بن عَديّ، رضي اللّه عنه:

هو صحابيّ جليل، شهد غزوتَي بدر، وأُحُد، وكان ممّن وقع في أسر المشركين، حيثُ باعوه بمكّة، فاشتراه بعض المشركين الّذين قَتَلَ لهم خبيب أحد أقاربهم، فمكث عندهم أسيراً، فلمّا خرجوا به ليقتلوه، ونصبوا له خشبة؛ ليصلبوه عليها في منطقة التّنعيم، طلب منهم أن يُصلّيَ لله ركعتين، فوافقوا له، فصلّى ركعتين، ثم قال: "واللّه، لولا أن تظنّوا إنّما طوّلت جزعاً وخوفاً من القتل، لاستكثرت من الصّلاة"، فكان أوّل مَنْ سنّ سُنّة الشّهادة، وهي الصّلاة عند القتل في سبيل اللّه، ثمّ رفعوه على الخشبة، فلما أوثقوه، وصلبوه عليها، أنشأ يقول:

ولستُ أُبالي حين أُقْتَلُ مسلماً على أيِّ جنبٍ كان في اللّهِ مَصْرَعي

٦٩

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

فسألوه: أتُحِبّ أنّ محمّداً مكانك؟ فقال: "واللّه، ما أُحِبُّ أنّي في أهلي، وأنّ محمّداً يُشاك بشوكة"، وقبل أن يقتلوه أخذوا يساومونه على إيمانه، لكنّ خبيب ظلّ صابراً ثابتاً.

وقبل استشهاده، قال: "اللّهمّ إنّا قد بلّغنا رسالة رسولك، فبلِّغْهُ ما يُصْنَعُ بنا"، ثمّ دعا عليهم قائلاً: "اللّهمّ أَحْصِهِمْ عدداً، واقتلْهم بدداً، ولا تغادر منهم أحداً"، ثمّ قتلوه، وأوحى اللّه إلى رسوله ما حدث لخبيب، فبعث عَمْرو بْنَ أميّةَ الضّمريّ؛ لينزلَهُ عن الخشبة الّتي صلبوه عليها، فجاء إلى الخشبة، وفكّ قيده، وأنزله، ووسَّدَ جثمانه، ووضعه على الأرض.

فكان -رضي اللّه عنه- أوّل من صُلِبَ في سبيل اللّه، وأوّل مَنْ سَنّ الصّلاةَ قبل الشّهادة.

نشاط (٢)

أتحدّثُ عن قصّة شهيد من بلدي، ارتقى دفاعاً عن دينه، ووطنه فِلَسطين.

Companion of the Prophet Khubayb bin ʻAdiyy – Allah be pleased with him:
Was a majestic Companion of the Prophet, has witnessed both battles of Badr and Uhud, was among those who were taken captive by the Idolaters and was put by them for sale in Mecca. Other Idolaters, whose relative was killed by Khubayb, bought him and he stayed at their place as a prisoner. When they took him out to kill him and prepared a wooden board to crucify him, in the area of Taniem, Khubayb asked them to let him pray two rakʿahs for Allah. They let him do so, and he prayed two rakʿahs.
Then he said: "By Allah, had you all not thought that I am hindering out of sorrow and fear to be killed, I would have gone on with my prayer."
Khubayb was the first to have formulated the tradition [sunnah] of martyrdom, which is the prayer said when one is about to be killed for the sake of Allah. He then was raised onto the wooden board, and when they tied and crucified him on it, he started saying:
[Center, in purple:] When I am killed as a Muslim I do not care as long as my death is for the sake of Allah
When Khubayb was asked: "Would you like Muhammad to be in your place?", he said: "By Allah, I would not have liked to be with my family, while Muhammad is pierced by a spear." And before they killed him, they started bargaining with him over his faith, yet Khubayb remained enduring and tenacious.
Before he died as a martyr, Khubayb said: "Oh Allah, we have thus let the message of Your Messenger be known, and so let him know what is done to us." Then Khubayb cursed the Idolators, saying: "Oh Allah, count their numbers, kill them one by one, and spare not any one of them." Then they killed him, and Allah revealed to His Messenger what happened to Khubayb. The Messenger sent ʻAmr bin Umayyah Al-Damari to take Khubayb off the wooden board on which he was crucified. When ʻAmr arrived at the wooden board, he untied Khubayb's chains, took him off, supported his dead body and laid him on the ground.
Khubayb – Allah be pleased with him – was the first to have been crucified for the sake of Allah, and the first to have formulated the tradition of the prayer before martyrdom.
Activity 2:
I will tell a story of a martyr from my town, who ascended in defense of his Faith and his homeland Palestine.

Antisemitism

Example 1.

***Islamic Education*, Grade 7, Vol. 2, 2020–2025, p. 66 (Previously: *Islamic Education*, Grade 7, Vol. 2, 2019, p. 66)**

A lesson on the life of the Prophet Muhammad recounts a battle waged in 624 AD between his forces and the ancient Jewish Arabian tribe of Banu Qaynuqa'. The textbook tells students that a major cause for that battle was an incident in which a Jewish goldsmith–presumably of the Qaynuqa' tribe –maliciously tied the side of a Muslim woman's robe to her back so that when she stood, her private parts were exposed in front of an amused Jewish crowd. The text places a strong emphasis on the Jewish identity of the offending actors in the story, repeatedly referring to them as "the Jews" (al-yahūd). This creates a strong association between the offenders' immoral actions and their Jewish identity, and places implicit responsibility for the incident on the entire Jewish collective, rather than contextualizing the event as being associated with an incidental political conflict between two ancient communities.

بنو قَيْنُقاع إحدى قبائلِ اليهودِ التي كانت تسكنُ المدينةَ المنوَّرة، وكان بينهم وبين النبيِّ (ﷺ) عهدٌ وميثاق، وقد أجلاهم النبيُّ (ﷺ) عن المدينة بسببِ غدرِهم ونقضِهم العهد، وكان ذلك في ١٥ شوال في السنة الثانية للهجرة.

أسباب الغزوة:

ذكر العلماءُ سببيْن للغزوة، هما:

١ تهديدُ يهودِ بني قَيْنُقاع للرسول (ﷺ) بعد غزوةِ بدرٍ بقولهم: لا يغرّنّك أنك قاتلت نفراً من قريش لا يعرفون القتال، إنّك لو قاتلتنا لعرفتَ أنّا نحن الناس، وإنّك لم تلقَ مِثلَنا.

٢ جلسَتْ امرأةٌ مُسلِمةٌ إلى صائغٍ يهوديّ في سوقِ بني قَيْنُقاع، فعقد الصائغُ طرفَ ثوبِها إلى ظهرِها وهي لا تشعر، فلما قامتْ انكشفتْ سوأتُها، فضحِكَ اليهودُ منها، فصاحت، فوثبَ رجلٌ من المسلمين على الصائغ فقتله، وهجمِ اليهودُ على المسلم فقتلوه.

فتوجّهَ النبيُّ (ﷺ) بجيشِه إلى يهودِ بني قينقاع، فتحصّنوا في حصونِهم، وحاصرهم النبيُّ عليه الصلاة والسلام خمسَ عشرةَ ليلةً لينزلوا على حُكمِه.

Banu Qaynuqa is one of the tribes of the Jews which inhabited Medina. They had a pact – an agreement with the Prophet (PBUH), yet they were exiled by the Prophet (PBUH) from Medina because of their treachery and violation of that pact. This took place on the 15th of Shawal on the second year of Hijrah [9 April 624 AD].

Reasons for the Battle [on Banu Qaynuqa]:
Scholars mention two reasons for the battle:
1. The Jews of Banu Qaynuqa threatened the Messenger (PBUH) […]
2. A Muslim woman sat next to a Jewish goldsmith in the Banu Qaynuqa market. The goldsmith tied the edge of her garment to her back without her noticing, so that when she stood up, her private parts were revealed. The Jews laughed at her, she screamed, and a Muslim man jumped on the goldsmith and killed him. The Jews then attacked the Muslim and killed him.

Therefore, the Prophet (PBUH) and his army marched against the Jews of Banu Qaynuqa, who barricaded themselves in their fortresses. The Prophet, peace be upon him, besieged them for fifteen nights before they submitted to him.

Example 2.

***Islamic Education,* Grade 5, Vol. 2, 2020–2025, pp. 65–66 (Previously: *Islamic Education*, Grade 5, Vol. 2, 2019, pp. 65–66)**

An Islamic Education lesson associates Jewish people with deicide by accusing an ancient Jewish tribe of attempting to kill the Prophet Muhammad while pointedly referring to them as "the Jews." The lesson describes an instance mentioned in oral Islamic history, where the ancient Jewish-Arabian tribe of Banu Nadhir attempted to kill the Prophet by dropping a rock on his head. The textbook addresses Banu Nadhir within this context repeatedly as "the Jews of Banu Nadhir" or simply "the Jews," creating a strong link between the described crime and the perpetrators' Jewish identity, and conveying to students that this bears importance for understanding the story. The textbook's choice of words also has the effect of placing responsibility for the act on the Jewish people collectively, rather than a specific historical group of people. This timeless, universal message is supported by the lesson's concluding statement, that "the enemies of Islam in all times and places" will always seek to harm Muslims, a category understood to include "the Jews" previously mentioned. It is worth noting that the crime of attacking the Prophet Muhammad is one of the most heinous imaginable to a faithful Muslim, akin to deicide, and the choice to associate it with Jewish people carries grave significance.

These examples taken from the PA curriculum, demonstrate that the core concerns identified prior to and during the Colonna review process, remain unresolved within UNRWA's educational environment. Despite repeated commitments to neutrality reform, problematic material continues to circulate in textbooks and supplementary teaching content used in UNRWA schools, while the agency's response has largely focused on procedural adjustments and reporting mechanisms rather than substantive curricular change. The continued use of such content, despite the claimed completion of recommendations, raises serious questions about the effectiveness, credibility, and depth of UNRWA's claimed reforms, particularly in relation to its obligations under Recommendations 34 and 35 of the Colonna Report.

مواقف من صبر النّبيّ ﷺ على الأذى في سبيل اللّه:

بعد أن جهر النّبيّ ﷺ بالدّعوة إلى اللّه تعالى، زادت قريش من التّضييق عليه، وحصاره، وتعذيب أصحابه وأتباعه، وقد تعدّدت صُوَر الإيذاء لرسول اللّه ﷺ، منها: التعذيب البدنيّ، والنّفسيّ، ومن المواقف والمحن الّتي تعرّض لها الرّسول ﷺ ما يأتي:

أوّلاً- محاولات قريش قتل الرّسول ﷺ، وصدّه عن الدّعوة، مثل:

ثانياً- محاولة يهود بني النضير قتل النّبيّ ﷺ: محاولة يهود بني النّضير بعد غزوة بدر قتل الرّسول ﷺ، بإلقاء حجر كبير على رأسه، وهو جالس إلى جانب جدار لهم، لكنّ اللّه بقدرته أرسل إليه الوحي جبريل، عليه السّلام، فأخبره أن اليهود يخطّطون لقتله، فانصرف عنهم مسرعاً إلى المدينة، وجهّز جيش المسلمين، ثمّ حاصرهم، وقاتلهم، وأخرجهم من المدينة المنورة.

ثالثاً- محاولة المنافقين قتل النبي ﷺ في غزوة تبوك: قال تعالى: ﴿وَهَمُّواْ بِمَا لَمْ يَنَالُواْ﴾(التوبة:٧٤) في غزوة تبوك، لما كان رسول الله ﷺ وصحابته رضوان الله عليهم بالعقبة، إذا باثني عشر رجلًا قد اعترضوا طريق القافلة، وقد كانوا ملثمين، فعرف حذيفة ابن اليمان ﷺ ركابهم، فقال رسول الله ﷺ: "هَؤُلَاءِ الْمُنَافِقُونَ إِلَى يَوْمِ الْقِيَامَةِ، وأَرَادُوا أَنْ يَزْحَمُوا رَسُولَ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم فِي الْعَقَبَةِ فَيُلْقُوهُ مِنْهَا"، فأشار حذيفة ﷺ قائلاً: أو لا تبعث إلى عشائرهم حتى يبعث إليك كلّ قوم برأس صاحبهم، فقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: "لَا، أَكْرَهُ أَنْ يَتَحَدَّثَ الْعَرَبُ بَيْنَهَا أَنَّ مُحَمَّدًا قَاتِلٌ لِقَوْمِهِ...". (تفسير ابن كثير، من رواية مسلم وأحمد).

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

وقد أنزل الله تعالى في المنافقين قرآناً يفضح أفعالهم الخبيثة وكراهية قلوبهم لرسول الله ﷺ.

إنّ أعداء الإسلام لن يكفّوا في كلّ زمان ومكان عن استخدام الوسائل والأساليب كافّة؛ لمحاربة الإسلام والمسلمين، ومحاربة دعاته، والسعي لإطفاء نور اللّه في الأرض، لكنّ اللّه ناصر دينه ودعاته، مهما تعدّدت أساليب التّشويه والإيذاء.

قَضِيَّةٌ للنِّقاش:

تَكرار محاولات الكفار والمشركين قتل النّبيّ ﷺ.

نشاط (٢)

أذكر مواقف أخرى يستخدمها الأعداء للإساءة للإسلام والمسلمين.

Situations where the Prophet (PBUH) Withstood Harm for the Sake of God:

After the Prophet (PBUH) came out preaching to God Almighty, the Quraysh [tribe] oppressed and cornered him even more, and abused his friends and followers. The harm inflicted on the Messenger of God (PBUH) took many forms, including physical and psychological abuse. Some of the situations and trials faced by the Messenger (PBUH) included the following:

1. Attempts by the Quraysh to kill the Messenger (PBUH), and prevent him from preaching, such as: […]

2. Attempts by the Jews of Banu Nadhir tribe to kill the Prophet (PBUH): the Jews of Banu Nadhir tribe attempted to kill the Prophet after the Battle of Badr, by throwing a large stone on top of his head, while he was sitting next to a fence of theirs. Yet God, with His divine power, sent the angel Gabriel to [the Prophet], and informed him that the Jews are scheming to kill him. [The Prophet] turned away from [the Jews] and hurried towards Medina, where he rallied the Muslim army. He then placed them under siege, battled them and forced them out of Medina.

Part 3: Attempts by the Hypocrites to kill the Prophet (PBUH) in the Battle of Tabouk: […]

The Enemies of Islam, in all times and places, will never tire of using any possible means or method, to wage war against Islam and the Muslims, to wage war against those who preach it, and to strive to extinguish the light of God on this earth. Yet, God supports His religion and those who preach for Him, against however many methods of defamation and insults there are.

Topic for discussion

The Infidels and the Hypocrites' repeated attempts to kill the Prophet (PBUH).

Activity 2:

List other situations used by the Enemies to harm Islam and the Muslims.

Israel

Example 1.

***Social Studies,* Grade 6, Vol. 1, 2020–2025, p. 54 (Previously: *Social Studies*, Grade 6, Vol. 1, 2019, p. 57)**

A Grade 6 lesson on the borders of Palestine unambiguously claims the entirety of Israel's internationally recognized territory and erases it from existence. Contrary to statements to a European Parliament hearing in 2021 by UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini that UNRWA teaches with maps showing both Israel and Palestine, textbooks used in UNRWA schools frequently depict the entire territory as "Palestine" while omitting Israel altogether. Lazzarini had claimed that the "first map you will find on this Platform" indicates Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. In addition, William Deere, the Director of the UNRWA Washington Representative Office claimed in 2024 that "all UNRWA schools utilize official UN maps which include Israel." Yet the existence of this social studies example directly contradicts these claims, demonstrating that they are false and that the material remains in circulation despite assertions to the contrary.

In the textbook, Palestine is defined as bordering Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea, with an area of over 27,000 km2, which thus adds Israel's territory to the Palestinian Territories. Israel itself is not mentioned, nor is the fact that these borders are not recognized by the international community or even that they are in dispute. An accompanying map, titled "Map of Palestine," clarifies these claims by depicting Palestine as coterminous with the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine (1922–1948); that is, including the entirety of what is now internationally recognized Israeli territory, as well as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The map juxtaposes the supposedly historic claim with modern borders and labels; for example, it describes the country east of Palestine by its modern name Jordan (*Al-'Urdunn*), rather than its historical name "Transjordan" (*Šarq al-'Urdunn*), strongly indicating that the map should be seen as an aspirational representation of the present, rather than history. The map also conspicuously omits Jewish-built cities and towns such as Tel Aviv, Petah Tikva, and Rishon LeZion–some of which existed well before the time of Mandate and were its largest urban centers–thereby erasing not only Israel's political borders but also its living population.

حدود فلسطين:

نَشاط (٥): نُلاحِظُ الخريطةَ الآتيةَ، وَنَسْتَنْتِجُ:

أ- حدود فِلَسْطينَ مِنْ جِهاتِها الأَرْبَع.

ب- نُسَمّي الدَّوْلَةَ العَرَبِيَّةَ الَّتي تُجاوِرُ فِلَسْطينَ، وَلَيْسَتْ مِنْ بِلادِ الشّام.

نَحْنُ تَعَلَّمْنا:

فِلَسْطين: هِيَ الرُّقْعَةُ الجُغْرافِيَّةُ الَّتي تَمْتَدُّ مِنَ البَحْرِ المُتَوَسِّطِ غَرْبًا، حتى نَهْرِ الأُرْدُنِ شَرْقًا، وَمِنَ لُبْنانَ وَسورِيَّةَ شَمالًا حَتّى خَليجِ العَقَبَةِ وَمِصْرَ جَنوبًا، وَتَبْلُغُ مِساحَتُها حوالي (٢٧،٠٢٧ ألف كم٢) تقريبًا، وتَقَعُ فلسطين في الجِهَةِ الغَرْبِيَّةِ مِنْ قارَّةِ آسيا، وَهِيَ المَمَرُّ البَرِيُّ الوَحيدُ الَّذي يَرْبِطُ بَيْنَ قارَّتَي آسيا وَإِفْريقيا، ما جَعَلَها مَسْلَكًا لِطُرُقِ القَوافِلِ التِّجارِيَّةِ وَالجُيوشِ مُنْذُ فَجْرِ التّاريخ، وَأَكْسَبَها أَهَمِّيَّةً اسْتراتيجِيَّةً، جَعَلَتْها مَطْمَعًا لِلْغُزاةِ وَالقُوى الاسْتِعْمارِيَّة.

(See the continuation of the example on the following page)

The Borders of Palestine
Activity 5: let's observe the following map and deduce:
A. What the borders of Palestine from all four directions are.
B. Let's name the Arab state that borders Palestine and is not part of the Levant.

We have learned:
Palestine: is the geographical area that extends from the Mediterranean Sea in the West to the Jordan River in the East, and from Lebanon and Syria in the North to the Gulf of Aqaba and Egypt in the South. It covers an area of approximately 27,027 km2. Palestine is situated in the western part of the continent of Asia and is the only land bridge between Asia and Africa. This fact has made it a passage route for trade caravans and armies since the dawn of history, and imparted to it strategic importance, which made it coveted by invaders and colonial powers.

[Caption under map:]
[Figure] 16: map of Palestine

Conclusion

The importance of these shortcomings extends beyond questions of methodology. The Colonna recommendations addressed issues that go to the core of UNRWA's mandate, including educational neutrality, oversight of teaching materials, staff conduct, governance, and accountability. These were not administrative technicalities, but reforms intended to address serious concerns identified by the review itself.

More than two years after the publication of the Colonna Report, there remains limited publicly available evidence that UNRWA has undertaken the kind of substantive institutional reform envisioned by the review process. Instead, the agency's response has been characterized by inconsistent reporting, shifting benchmarks for implementation, opaque funding requests, and a reliance on procedural or administrative measures that often appear disconnected from meaningful structural change.

UNRWA's adoption of the "Minimum Viable Product" methodology illustrates this broader pattern. By redefining what constitutes successful implementation and lowering the threshold for recommendations to be classified as "completed," the agency has been able to project accelerated progress while avoiding clear and externally verifiable standards of accountability. At the same time, recommendations already described as completed have repeatedly reappeared in subsequent funding requests, often accompanied by substantial financial demands lacking detailed justification, implementation plans, or measurable deliverables. These inconsistencies raise broader concerns regarding transparency, oversight, and the relationship between UNRWA's reform claims and its continued requests for donor support.

The concerns are particularly acute in relation to UNRWA's educational environment. Despite explicit recommendations requiring the removal of antisemitic and violent material, there is little evidence that problematic content has been comprehensively eliminated from textbooks or supplementary educational materials used within UNRWA schools. While the agency has emphasized digital learning initiatives, teacher training, and review mechanisms, IMPACT-se research continues to identify material promoting jihad, glorifying violence, and perpetuating antisemitic narratives within educational content still used in practice. UNRWA's position that it lacks the mandate to alter host-country curricula further undermines the credibility of its claims regarding implementation of Recommendations 34 and 35.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the Colonna process has thus far functioned more as a framework for procedural compliance than as a mechanism for deep institutional reform. The emphasis on reporting progress, redefining benchmarks, and expanding administrative initiatives risks creating the appearance of progress without resolving the underlying neutrality concerns that prompted the review in the first place.

This does not diminish the importance of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians. However, it does underscore the necessity of rigorous external oversight, transparent reporting standards, and independently verifiable implementation measures if donor states and international institutions are to credibly assess whether meaningful reform within UNRWA is actually taking place.

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